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STRUCTURED TO FAIL: LESSONS FROM THE
TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S FAULTY
PANDEMIC PLANNING AND RESPONSE
Alejandro E. Camacho* & Robert L. Glicksman**
The Trump Administration’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic is a stark
reminder that poorly designed government can be a matter of life and death. This article
explains how the Administration’s careless and delayed response to the crisis was made
immeasurably worse by its confused and confusing reallocation of authority to perform or
supervise tasks essential to reducing the virus’s ravages.
After exploring the rationale for and impact of prior federal reorganizations
responding to public health crises, the article shows how a combination of unnecessary and
unhelpful overlapping authority and a thoughtless mix of centralized and decentralized
authority contributed to the Trump Administration’s slow and ineffective effort to stem the
virus’s tide. Furthermore, the Administration’s earlier dismantling of the structure built in
the wake of prior outbreaks disabled a mechanism crucial to any federal response to public
health threats—its ability to coordinate the efforts of public and private actions to effectively
combat the crisis.
The article identifies numerous valuable lessons about government organization
from the COVID-19 experience that should guide policymakers’ deliberations in the likely
event that they embark upon an effort to address the mistakes plaguing the Trump
Administration’s dismal response. More generally, it uses the government’s response to
COVID-19 to explore a number of insights about how to better think about and configure
government institutions to prepare for and manage complex social problems like a pandemic.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The spread of a virulent pathogen poses challenges to governance even
under the best circumstances.1 But society stands the best chance of minimizing
illness and death, just as it does in addressing myriad social problems, if it is wellorganized to take on those challenges. Unfortunately, the Trump Administration’s
planning for and response to the COVID-19 pandemic provide a stark reminder that
poorly designed government can be a matter of life and death. The Administration’s
public recognition or acknowledgment of the severity of the crisis was, to put it
mildly, slow to develop.2 President Trump himself was well aware of the health
1.

See infra Part II.

2.
See Eric Lipton et al., He Could Have Seen What Was Coming: Behind Trump’s Failure on the
Virus, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/11/us/politics/coronavirus-trumpresponse.html (noting that it took the president five weeks to take aggressive action to confront the
coronavirus danger after the first coronavirus case was identified in the United States). The President also
sought to stoke distrust in science and curry favor with segments of the population who were more
concerned about restrictions on their autonomy caused by public health directives, in the hopes of boosting
his reelection chances. See Renée Graham, Trump’s Death Cult Presidency, BOS. GLOBE (May 26, 2020,
4:29 PM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/05/26/opinion/trumps-death-cult-presidency/ (noting
that staunch Trump supporters are willing to die to get back to life as usual and stating that “[p]eople are
behaving as if their inalienable rights include ignoring public safety guidelines and endangering others in
the middle of a pandemic”); Michael D. Shear & Sarah Mervosh, Trump Encourages Protest Against
GovernorsWhoHaveImposedVirusRestrictions,N.Y.TIMES(Apr.17,2020),https://www.nytimes.com/20
20/04/17/us/politics/trump-coronavirus-governors.html (“Openly supporting [protestors] who challenge
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threats posed by COVID-19 at the very early stage of the pandemic, but nonetheless
downplayed those threats in public comments.3 Kenneth Barnard, a retired Rear
Admiral, a physician, and a top security and health advisor for both Presidents
Clinton and George W. Bush, put it simply as the virus’s toll in the United States
increased: “Delays in response cost lives. When you lose time with an epidemic, it
really matters.”4
But the bungled initial response (or lack of response) was made worse by
the Administration’s confused and confusing reallocation and abdication of authority
to perform or supervise tasks essential to reducing the virus’s ravages.5 That
reordering disabled an important mechanism available to the federal government to
respond to public health threats—its ability to coordinate the efforts of public and
private actions to effectively combat the crisis. And its earlier dismantling of the
structure built in the wake of prior outbreaks to respond to the spread of contagious
diseases6 contributed to its inability to craft a plan for or implement a coherent and
effective response to a virus to which millions of Americans were exposed and which
killed hundreds of thousands in the last year of the Trump Administration.
Clearly, the manner in which government is organized to deal with public
health crises is not the only determinant of the success or failure of its management
of such crises. For example, priority-setting, the adequacy of the resources devoted
to the problem, and the commitment and competence of the officials charged with
pandemic planning and response all have the capacity to influence a pandemic’s
impact for better or worse.7 Organization matters, however, in that poorly organized
programs can derail even well-funded and conscientious efforts to stem the adverse
social consequences of a public health crisis such as a viral pandemic.
The federal government’s planning and response to COVID-19 provide
several more general lessons about how to analyze and organize government
institutions to better address social problems.8 How government authority is

the stay-at-home orders could help the president re-energize the coalition of conservative Republicans and
working-class populists who agree with the anti-government sentiment that helped power Mr. Trump’s
election victory in 2016.”).
3.
See Nancy Cook, Meredith McGaw & Adam Cancry, What Did Trump Know and When Did
HeKnowIt?InsideHisFeb.7Admission,POLITICO(Sept.10,2020,9:17PM),https://www.politico.com/n
ews/2020/09/10/trump-coronavirus-bob-woodward-412222. The Director of the Centers for Disease
Control (CDC) understood the dangers posed by the pandemic very early in 2020, and “[t]hroughout
January, President Trump received memos from advisors and reports from intelligence agencies, which he
may or may not have read, explaining that the COVID-19 outbreak in China was serious and ultimately
would pose a tremendous threat to the United States.” Michael J. Klarman, The Supreme Court 2019 Term,
Foreword: The Degradation of American Democracy – And the Court, 134 HARV. L. REV. 4, 101 (2020).
4.
Kimberly Dozier & Vera Bergengruen, Under Fire for Coronavirus Response, Trump Officials
DefendDisbandingPandemicTeam,TIME(Mar.19,2020,1:59PM),https://time.com/5806558/administra
tion-officials-fight-criticism/.
5.

See infra Part IV.

6.

See infra Part III.

7.

See also infra notes 28–32 and accompanying text.

8.

See infra Part VI.
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allocated can profoundly influence the fate of government programs—even though
analysis of such structural matters is often subordinated, if it is considered at all, to
considerations about the substantive tools of government programs and the
procedures used to implement them. The current public health crisis highlights the
importance of recognizing that (1) government performs a variety of different
functions, (2) authority to address social problems is necessarily allocated along
several dimensions of authority, and (3) policymakers should consider differentiating
allocations of authority along these dimensions on a function-by-function basis.
Moreover, organizational choices should be driven by analysis of the policy tradeoffs
that alternative allocations of authority entail. Recognition that these tradeoffs exist
and careful consideration of how to resolve them should be critical components of
policymakers’ deliberations as they design government institutions to prepare for and
manage complex social problems like a pandemic.
The opportunity for federal policymakers to engage in the kind of multifaceted analysis we propose here is likely to be imminent. It seems clear that a
reckoning is coming. At local, state, federal, and even international scales,
policymakers from different political persuasions are wondering how the structure of
inter-governmental organization might have failed in handling9 the worst public
health crisis in at least a century.10 Members of Congress have called for hearings like
those that occurred after the crisis that began the twenty-first century—the 9/11
attacks—to explore the reasons for the federal government’s deficient response to
COVID-19.11 The investigations and analysis conducted by the 9/11 Commission,
which Congress created to better prepare for the threat of future terrorist attacks,
culminated in a report that recommended structural reforms in the nation’s
intelligence-gathering apparatus12 and the adoption of legislation to implement those

9.
See, e.g., Eli Nachmany, Post, Legislative Hurdles and Unintended Consequences: Potential Pitfalls
of Vice President Biden's Interest in Cabinet Restructuring, U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE, May 2020, at 1, 2 (“Given
the extraordinary spending and policing measures that have characterized state and federal responses to
the virus to date, it is not inconceivable that even a divided Congress might rethink the form of America's
public health bureaucracy.”); Dan Balz, Crisis Exposes How America Has Hollowed Out Its Government,
WASH. POST (May 16, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/politics/governmenthollowed-out-weaknesses/ [hereinafter Balz, Crisis] (discussing debate over whether a new wave of
“reinventing government” is an appropriate response to COVID-19 and recommending that any such
reform focus on “finding ways to improve how agencies collaborate when confronted with the kind of
crisis now facing the country”); Mara Liasson, Coronavirus Response Shows How a National Crisis Can Again
TransformPolitics,NAT’LPUB.RADIO(Apr.22,2020,5:01AM),https://www.npr.org/2020/04/22/83996
5140/coronavirus-response-shows-how-a-national-crisis-can-again-transform-politics (arguing that the
pandemic could result in an expanded role for the federal government and lead to policy changes that
“rearrange traditional political divisions”).
10. Georges C. Benjamin, Pandemic Influenza: Preparing for the Worst, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 663, 663
(2006) (“The 1918-1919 influenza pandemic, commonly known as the ‘Spanish Flu,’ resulted in the death
of 675,000 Americans and over 50 million people worldwide.”) (footnote omitted).
11.

See infra Part VI.

12. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT
(2004), https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf.
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recommendations.13 It seems likely that policymakers will debate whether and how
to pursue a similar structural reconfiguration in federal pandemic response authority
to address the lessons learned from COVID-19.14
This article explores how the organization of the Trump Administration’s
public health authorities adversely affected federal planning and responses to the
COVID-19 pandemic. As with most other institutional design assessments, it is not
possible to fully cordon off federal pandemic planning and response from the broader
social, economic, and regulatory context in which it exists. As the experience with
COVID-19 has demonstrated, the ripple effects of a serious viral pandemic can
extend into all corners of the nation’s—indeed the Earth’s—social and economic
fabric. Most notably, federal pandemic planning and response will necessarily be
affected by, and affect, a range of government action or inaction taken at the local,
state, and international levels. Although this article considers some of the interactions
among federal and state officials in planning for and responding to the pandemic, it
largely confines its analysis to the impact of the Trump Administration’s allocation
of authority among federal officials.
Similarly, a capacious conception of pandemic planning and response might
extend beyond the article’s focus on the direct federal public health efforts to plan
for and respond to the pandemic to minimize the number of people who become ill
or die from the disease. Pandemic planning and response might be understood as
involving allocations of public authority over the entire range of regulatory sectors,
such as health care, education,15 social welfare,16 financial, and other markets.17
13. See ALEJANDRO E. CAMACHO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, REORGANIZING GOVERNMENT:
A FUNCTIONAL AND DIMENSIONAL FRAMEWORK 155–58 (2019) (discussing the 9/11 Commission’s
report, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638
(2004), and how that legislation failed to reorganize intelligence-gathering authority in ways likely to
address the problems identified by the 9/11 Commission).
14. The House passed a bill in April 2020 that would have established a select Subcommittee on
the Coronavirus Crisis as an investigate subcommittee of the Committee on Oversight and Reform. H.R.
Res. 935, 116th Cong. (2020), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-resolution/935.
Legislation was also introduced in the Senate that would have directed the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget to convene an Interagency Task Force to analyze the preparedness of the United
States for national pandemics. S. 4204, 116th Cong. (2020), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116thcongress/senate-bill/4204/text. State legislators have also begun analyzing pandemic response authority.
See,e.g.,SpecialCommitteeonPandemicEmergencyResponse,CALIFORNIASTATESENATE,https://www.se
nate.ca.gov/special-committee-pandemic-emergency-response (listing oversight hearings concerning
COVID-19).
15. See, e.g., Julie M. Donohue & Elizabeth Miller, COVID-19 and School Closures, 324 JAMA 845
(2020), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2769033.
16. E.g., Unemployment Insurance Relief During COVID-19 Outbreak, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
https://www.dol.gov/coronavirus/unemployment-insurance (discussing political measures aimed at
expanding access to unemployment benefits in response to COVID-19).
17.

See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS, SHARED RESPONSIBILITY, GLOBAL SOLIDARITY: RESPONDING

TOTHESOCIO-ECONOMICIMPACTSOFCOVID-191(2020),https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/2

020-03/SG-Report-Socio-Economic-Impact-of-Covid19.pdf (“The [International Monetary Fund]
projects recovery in 2021 only if the world succeeds in containing the virus and take[s] the necessary
economic measures.”) (footnote omitted); Policy Responses to COVID-19: Policy Tracker, INT’L MONETARY
FUND, https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19 (last updated
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Accordingly, the range of governmental activities one might consider in evaluating
public pandemic management could theoretically include authority at every
governmental scale and virtually every regulatory sector. Indeed, we have argued that
careful assessment of each of the many overlapping and intersecting regulatory
ecosystems is vital for more effective design of public governance.18 Yet a review of
these countless structural components is outside the scope of this brief article. In our
view, the article’s focus on the manner in which federal planning and response can
affect efforts to minimize spread of the disease effectively illustrates the value of the
delineated dimensional and functional framework for considering public
organizational alternatives. Our hope is that this example can serve as a template and
catalyst for other analyses that explore allocational configurations and tradeoffs
governing these intersecting areas of governance.
The article is structured as follows. Part II describes why government
organization, though not the only variable in determining the fate of government
programs, can help accomplish or impede public policy goals. It describes an
innovative framework for evaluating alternative structural configurations for
government programs. The framework rests on two insights: (1) that governmental
authority is organized along three different but interrelated dimensions; and (2) that
governmental structures can and often should differ based on the function being
performed. Part III explores government reorganizations that occurred in the George
W. Bush and Obama Administrations in response to public health crises, as well as
the rationale for and impact of those reorganizations.
In Part IV, we describe the Trump Administration’s planning for and
response to the COVID-19 pandemic, focusing on the nature of each of these
functions along each of the three dimensions of authority identified in our
framework. Unfortunately, the combination of unnecessary and unhelpful
overlapping authority, thoughtless mix of centralized and decentralized authority,
and, perhaps most importantly, lack of coordination among multiple agencies and
authorities, contributed to a slow and ineffective effort to stem the virus’s tide.
Part V identifies five broader lessons about government organization that
the United States’ COVID-19 experience has provided thus far. It suggests that these
lessons should guide policymakers’ deliberations in the likely event that they embark
upon an effort to reorganize the federal government’s public health infrastructure to
avoid the organizational mistakes that have plagued the Trump Administration’s
dismal planning for and response to COVID-19. In particular, it provisionally
identifies how a reliance on decentralized, overlapping, and horizontally coordinated
federal planning and decentralized, distinct, and hierarchically coordinated federal
response actions are likely to better balance the tradeoffs implicated in managing a
pandemic than the approach pursued by the Trump Administration.

Feb. 3, 2021) (“This policy tracker summarizes the key economic responses governments are taking to
limit the human and economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.”).
18.

See CAMACHO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 13, at 234–35.
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II. THE IMPORTANCE OF GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION
It is hard to imagine a better and more compelling illustration of the
importance of good government than managing a pandemic. Suddenly, it is
blindingly obvious that, while individuals can and must play their part in minimizing
risks to the health and the safety of themselves and their families, government action
and inter-governmental coordination are essential to an effective societal response.19
The government can negotiate with foreign governments for samples of the virus to
use in developing tests and vaccines.20 It can provide the crucial information people
need to make decisions about how to respond to serious public health risks, such as
by social distancing and wearing masks.21 Public authorities can impose essential
restrictions on travel and large public gatherings that risk accelerating the virus’s
spread.22 They can devote resources to developing better testing and contact tracing
methods.23 Government can make sure that medical equipment and facilities are
available and that treatments are safe and effective.24
These activities do not (and should not) occur spontaneously. They require
the development of comprehensive plans for responding to a pandemic before its
appearance, which must then be implemented through response activities when the
risk becomes a reality. At the federal level, the aspects of pandemic planning and
19. Cf. Lawrence O. Gostin & Benjamin E. Berkman, Pandemic Influenza: Ethics, Law, and the
Public’s Health, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 121, 153 (2007) (“[C]onsiderable variation in response plans could
prevent or delay an efficient response in a multi-country public health emergency. Cooperation among
national authorities and coordination by international bodies is therefore necessary.”).
20. See Laura Grebe, Requiring Genetic Source Disclosure in the United States, 44 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 367, 373 (2011) (“[D]uring the avian influenza (bird flu) outbreak in the early 2000s, many scientists
and researchers obtained virus samples from Indonesia and Thailand—two countries on the front line of
the growing pandemic . . . and vaccines to fight the avian influenza were quickly developed.”); Jayanthi
Wolf et al., Applying Lessons from the Ebola Vaccine Experience for SARS-CoV-2 and Other Epidemic Pathogens,
NPJ VACCINES, June 2020, at 1, 4 (noting the importance of regional and international cooperation in
developing an Ebola vaccine).
21. See, e.g., R. Gregory Evans & Rachel D. Schwartz, Preparedness and Response Paralysis:
Ramifications for Pandemic Planning, 6 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 594, 610 (2009) (“[Public health] planners and
the bodies they represent naturally turn to their governments for guidance and information on how to
proceed.”).
22. See Trygve Ottersen et al., Ebola Again Shows the International Health Regulations Are Broken:
What Can Be Done Differently to Prepare for the Next Epidemic?, 42 AM. J.L. & MED. 356, 377 (2016) (“A
prevailing recommendation after the H1N1 pandemic, therefore, was to strengthen compliance with the
[International Health Regulations’] provisions on travel and trade restrictions.”); Mark A. Rothstein, From
SARS to Ebola: Legal and Ethical Considerations for Modern Quarantine, 12 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 227, 234
(2015) (recognizing “a federal role in coordination, technical support, and prevention of the interstate and
international spread of contagion”).
23. See, e.g., Megan McArdle, Opinion, The Government Should Cover Coronavirus Testing. And
ConservativesShouldSupportIt.,WASH.POST(Mar.3,2020,7:08PM),https://www.washingtonpost.com
/opinions/2020/03/03/government-should-cover-coronavirus-testing-conservatives-should-support-it/.
24. See, e.g., Eileen M. Kane, Achieving Clinical Equality in an Influenza Pandemic: Patent Realities,
39 SETON HALL L. REV. 1137, 1159 (2009) (“[T]he development of a pandemic vaccine is likely to be
initiated through a unique and coordinated sequence of events: public health authorities’ identification of
a consensus virus for vaccine development, followed by vaccine design and clinical testing, and then official
purchasing by national governments from commercial manufacturers to build stockpile capacity.”).
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response with which we are concerned refer to those particular public health activities
directed at monitoring, containing, and mitigating the spread of a disease.25 In this
article, federal pandemic planning includes those early-stage governmental activities
intended to consider, develop a framework for, and/or guide decisions for later
governmental action in preparation for disease or a pandemic.26 Complementarily,
federal pandemic response refers to the range of activities that occur after the advent
of (and intended to neutralize) a disease event, ideally in the implementation of
pandemic planning activities, including monitoring, containment, and the
distribution of treatments.27
25. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., PANCAP ADAPTED: U.S. GOVERNMENT
COVID-19 RESPONSE PLAN 6, 9 (2020), https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/6819-covid-19response-plan/d367f758bec47cad361f/optimized/full.pdf [hereinafter PANCAP]. The Government
Accountability Office has described “[t]he mission of the federal response” as being “to leverage available
federal resources to prepare for, respond to, and recover from COVID-19,” and referred to PanCAP’s aim
as “help[ing] federal departments and agencies to coordinate activities to limit the spread of COVID-19;
to mitigate the effect of illness, suffering, and death; and to sustain critical infrastructure and key resources
in the United States.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-20-625, COVID-19:
OPPORTUNITIES TO IMPROVE FEDERAL RESPONSE AND RECOVERY EFFORTS 87 (2020),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/710/707839.pdf [hereinafter GAO-20-625]. For the scope of this paper,
mitigation does not include economic and social engineering such as the provision of stimulus checks or
unemployment insurance, which are meant to mitigate the adverse economic impacts of a pandemic, for
reasons described above. See CAMACHO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 13, at 234–35 and accompanying text.
26. When the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) issued its COVID-19 Response
plan (PanCAP) in March 2020, it cited several sources of its authority to do so, including the Public
Health Service Act, Pub. L. No. 78-410, 58 Stat. 682 (1944) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 201–
300hh-16). PANCAP, supra note 25, at 6. As of early 2020, that Act required the Secretary of HHS to
prepare the National Health Security Strategy and “an accompanying implementation plan for public
health preparedness and response.” 42 U.S.C. § 300hh-1(a)(1). The Strategy must “describe potential
emergency health security threats and identify the process for achieving preparedness goals.” Id. These
goals include (1) “[i]ntegrating public health and private medical capabilities”; (2) developing capabilities
for disease detection, investigation, and containment (“including capabilities for isolation, quarantine,
social distancing,” and distribution of health care services and supplies), and risk communication and
public preparedness; (3) “ensuring coordination between Federal, state, local, and tribal planning,
preparedness, and response”; and (4) improving inter-governmental coordination “to prevent, detect, and
respond to outbreaks of . . . zoonotic disease,” taking into account human and animal interactions. Id. §
300hh-1(b). “All available evidence for COVID-19 suggests that SARS-CoV-2 has a zoonotic source.”
WORLD HEALTH ORG., CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 (COVID-19): SITUATION REPORT–94 1 (2020),
https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/situation-reports/20200423-sitrep-94-covid19.pdf; see also John S. MacKenzie & David W. Smith, COVID-19—A Novel Zoonotic Disease: A Review of
the Disease, the Virus, and Public Health Measures, 32 ASIAN PAC. J. PUB. HEALTH 145 (2020). Cf.
CAMACHO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 13, at 27 (defining planning).
27. The White House Coronavirus Task Force created on January 27, 2020 established a Unified
Coordination Group (UCG) to serve as “the primary field entity for federal response.” GAO-20-265,
supra note 25, at 89. The UCG established a series of operational task forces “to provide operational
guidance and secure resources to coordinate the whole-of-government response to COVID-19.” Id. at 90.
The responsibilities of these task forces help define the parameters of the federal government’s response
to COVID-19, as the term response is used in this article. The task force responsibilities included
coordinating testing supply chains and needs; ensuring the availability of protective equipment and other
health care workers, facilities, and supplies; developing community mitigation strategies to slow disease
spread and reduce morbidity and mortality; establishing baseline understanding of medical
countermeasures; providing comprehensive data and analytics to support “evidence-based decisions for
COVID-19 response and recovery operations,” such as demand for ventilators, personal protective
equipment, and therapeutics; and maintaining situational awareness and coordination across federal
agencies. Id. at 91–92. We think that actions to monitor, contain, and distribute treatments for the disease
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The success of such government initiatives in managing a pandemic
depends on many factors. Of course, the effectiveness of disaster planning and
response, and government more generally, is influenced by the interest, competence,
and good faith of government personnel;28 the extent of resources provided;29 the
efficient and fair distribution of these resources;30 and the particular forms of
substantive strategies31 and processes adopted.32 But even the best-designed and wellinformed plans are likely to go awry if government is not organized in ways that
facilitate, rather than hinder, public and private capacity to respond to social
problems that individuals, businesses, and other private institutions cannot tackle on
their own.
encapsulates the UGC’s description of the “whole-of-government” response it was charged with leading.
For purposes of this article, response does not include research and development activities by government
scientists or private pharmaceutical companies pertaining to treatments such as new vaccines, as these
activities largely implicate the financing function (and we focus on planning and implementation) and
involve public-private relationships (while we confine our analysis largely to intergovernmental allocations
of authority).
28. See, e.g., Steve Cogen, COVID-19 Requires a Competent, Professional Federal Government,
COLUM.UNIV.:EARTHINST.,ST.OFTHEPLANET(Mar.30,2020),https://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/202
0/03/30/covid-19-requires-competent-professional-federal-government/; Jennifer Rubin, Opinion, It’s Not
About the Size of the Government. It’s About Competence., WASH. POST (Apr. 20, 2020, 9:30 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/04/20/its-not-about-size-government-its-aboutcompetence/.
29. See, e.g., Edgar Walters, Before Texas Can Safely Reopen Its Economy, Health Experts Say These
FourThingsMustHappen,TEX.TRIB.(Apr.27,2020,12:00AM),https://www.texastribune.org/2020/04/
27/texas-coronavirus-health-experts-say-more-resources-needed-reopen/ (noting the opinion of public
health experts that successful containment of the virus in Texas would require “personnel and lab capacity
for testing and contact tracing that is perhaps an order of magnitude greater than what is currently
available”).
30. See, e.g., Anya van Wagtendonk, The Government Is Distributing Emergency Covid-19 Supplies.
But Some States Are Losing Out., VOX (Mar. 29, 2020, 1:27 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2020/3/29/21198704/emergency-covid-19-supplies-fema-states-federal-government.Some
sources have reported that the Trump Administration provided preferential treatment in its Covid-19
response to the President’s political allies. See, e.g., Jonathan Allen, Phil McCausland, & Cyrus Farivar,
Want a Mask Contract or Some Ventilators? A White House Connection Helps, NBC NEWS (Apr. 24, 2020,
4:30AM),https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/political-influence-skews-trump-scoronavirus-response-n1191236 (“Trump and his top aides have played favorites in awarding contracts and
allocating scarce resources.”); Jill Colvin, Calling Trump: When Connections Help Steer Virus Supplies,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 11, 2020), https://apnews.com/4b50dd9806e6d31607b23dfe38df4408.
Controversy also arose when members of Congress were among those to whom one of the approved
COVID-19 vaccines was first made available. See Stephen Loiaconi, Members of Congress Face Backlash As
TheyGetPriorityforScarceVaccine,13ABCWHAMNEWS(Dec.21,2020),https://13wham.com/news/co
nnect-to-congress/vaccination-of-members-of-congress-spurs-backlash-questions-of-fairness.
31. See, e.g., Jonathan Todres et al., International Health Law, 40 INT’L L. 453, 455 (2006)
(discussing meeting of representatives of over 100 countries under the auspices of the World Health
Organization to fashion national and international pandemic preparedness and response plans to address
the threat of avian influenza).
32. See, e.g., Lance Gable, Evading Emergency: Strengthening Emergency Responses Through Integrated
Pluralistic Governance, 91 OR. L. REV. 375, 390 (2012) (stating that because “public health emergencies are
discrete events that present significant threats to health that are distinct from the health challenges
endemic to a population . . . procedures designed to govern the health system and to protect health in
everyday circumstances may not be capable of handling the novel challenges posed by a public health
emergency”).
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In a recent book,33 we explained the importance of organization to effective,
accountable, and fair government. The case studies we explored revealed that it is
important to distinguish among three dimensions of authority—the extent to which
government authority is centralized (or decentralized),34 overlapping (or distinct),35
and coordinated (or independent).36 There may be good reasons to prefer organizing
government toward one end of a dimension but countervailing advantages to
structuring government toward the other end. For instance, having distinct and clear
authority over certain jobs or functions can help reduce the risk of conflicting
regulation.37 For some others, having overlapping authority can help provide a
regulatory safety net if one agency or level of government falters.38 Though there
might be an impulse to consolidate authority, there are real advantages (in expertise
and accountability) to keeping some authority decentralized.39 And keeping authority
independent can prevent groupthink, reduce administrative costs, and even reduce
the risk of government inaction.40 But coordination of governmental authority can
be helpful in managing a sudden and multi-faceted problem, like a pandemic, that
requires rapid action by multiple public and private entities.41
To make informed choices about which organizational options to select,
policymakers should assess the trade-offs of allocating authority at different points
along each dimension and determine which configuration is optimal.42 These
assessments are context-specific, and the configuration of authority should be toggled
differently to address different components of the problem. Different types of
coordination (varying from mere communication to opportunities to comment, to
harmonization, to more hierarchical relationships) can have dissimilar advantages,
and different forms can be deployed in diverse contexts.43 Our book’s case studies
also highlight the value of varying these allocations of authority for different
government functions (such as the planning and implementation functions assessed
in this article, but also information distribution, analysis of information, setting
regulatory standards, and enforcing those standards),44 instead of choosing, as is often
33. See generally CAMACHO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 13. We provide a partial and preliminary
introduction to our framework in Alejandro E. Camacho & Robert L. Glicksman, Functional Government
in 3-D: A Framework for Evaluating Allocations of Government Authority, 51 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 19 (2014).
34.

CAMACHO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 13, at 32–37.

35.

Id. at 38–43.

36.

Id. at 43–49.

37.

Id. at 40.

38.

Id. at 41–43.

39.

Id. at 34–35.

40.

Id. at 47–49.

41.

Id. at 44–46.

42. See id. at 50 fig.2.5 (summarizing the different justifications for allocating authority at different
ends of each dimension).
43. See id. at 45–46 (describing a spectrum of different forms of coordination and arguing that
each form of coordination “will have its own set of advantages and disadvantages”).
44.

See id. at 26 fig.1.2 (listing categories of functional jurisdiction).
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done, the same structure for each task the government is charged with addressing.45
In short, it is important to be thoughtful about the organizational choices and their
tradeoffs, and to adapt these allocations to account for new information or changes
in circumstances. Failing to do so runs the risk that government programs will
operate ineffectively or in ways that conflict with social values to which policymakers
are committed.

III.PRIOR REORGANIZATIONS IN RESPONSE TO PAST OUTBREAKS
The degree to which the organization of government can facilitate or hinder
the pursuit of objectives such as effective and efficient pandemic planning or
response should not have come as a surprise in 2020.46 In 2005, President George W.
Bush directed his homeland security adviser to develop a national pandemic strategy
after reading a book about the flu pandemic of 1918.47 The strategy was designed to
address both planning (or preparedness) and response. It was comprised of three
“pillars”: preparedness and communication, surveillance and detection, and response
and containment.48 The planning components included: (1) working with
multilateral health organizations such as the World Health Organization to support
the development of pandemic response plans, and (2) working with states and
localities to develop medical surge capacity plans and integrate the private sector and
critical infrastructure entities into planning efforts.49 The response and containment
component included (1) specified measures to slow or limit the spread of the
outbreak, (2) activation of plans to distribute medical countermeasures, (3) assisting
the flow of public health and medical personnel and medical equipment to areas of
need, (4) encouraging the development of “coordination mechanisms” across
American industries, (5) activation of contingency plans, (6) ensuring effective risk
45.

See id. at 25–30.

46. For discussion of lessons learned from earlier public health crises, including the post-World
War I Spanish Flu pandemic, see Wendy E. Parmet, Pandemics, Populism and the Role of Law in the H1N1
Vaccine Campaign, 4 ST. LOUIS U.J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 113, 115–24 (2010); Jeff Thaler, 2020 Vision:
What Can a Governor Do When the 2nd COVID-19 Surge Comes?, AM. CONST. SOC’Y: EXPERT F. (May 19,
2020), https://www.acslaw.org/expertforum/2020-vision-what-can-a-governor-do-when-the-2nd-covid19-surge-comes/. Section 201(a) of the Disaster Relief Act Amendments of 1974 authorized the President
“to establish a program of disaster preparedness” that would include “preparation of disaster preparedness
plans for mitigation, warning, emergency operations, rehabilitation, and recovery,” and “coordination of
Federal, State, and local preparedness programs.” Pub. L. No. 93-288, § 201(a), 88 Stat. 143, 145 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 5131(a)). The statute defined a disaster primarily in terms of weather-related events, but
also included “other catastrophe[s].” Id. § 102(2) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 5122(2) (2018) (defining
“major disaster” as “any natural catastrophe”)). The Trump Administration’s 2019 PanCAP plan cited the
1974 Act as a source of authority. See PANCAP, supra note 25, at 6.
47. Dan Balz, America Was Unprepared for a Major Crisis. Again., WASH. POST (Apr. 4, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/politics/america-was-unprepared-for-a-major-crisisagain/.
48. HOMELAND SEC. COUNCIL, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA 3 (2005),
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/pdf/pandemic-influenza-strategy-2005.pdf
[hereinafter
HSC, NATIONAL STRATEGY 2005].
49.

Id. at 4.
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communication to the public, and (7) working with state and local governments to
assure the safety of the food supply.50 Indeed, the Bush strategy repeatedly
emphasized the importance of coordination within and between governments, and
between governments and the private sector with respect to both planning51 and
response.52
The next year, Congress enacted the Pandemic and All-Hazards
Preparedness Act (PAHPA).53 Like the Bush strategy, the 2006 Act recognized the
need for federal interagency coordination. It charged the Secretary of Health and
Human Services (“HHS”) with leading all federal public health and medical
response to public health emergencies and incidents covered by the National
Response Plan developed pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002.54 PAPHA
directed the Secretary to collaborate with various cabinet heads to establish an
interagency agreement under which the Secretary would assume “operational control
of emergency public health and medical response assets, as necessary, in the event of
a public health emergency.”55 The Act also created a new position within HHS, the
Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR), whose responsibilities
include coordination with other federal officials “to ensure integration of Federal
preparedness and response activities for public health emergencies,” and to
coordinate with state, local, and tribal public health officials “to ensure effective
integration of Federal public health and medical assets” during such an emergency.56
Further, PAPHA provided that every four years, beginning in 2009, the HHS
Secretary would prepare and submit to relevant congressional committees “a
coordinated strategy (to be known as the National Health Security Strategy) . . . and

50. Id. at 8–9. These components of the Bush response strategy are similar to the elements of
what we define as pandemic responses in this article – actions to (1) monitor, (2) contain (through
mechanisms such as distribution of medical equipment (including testing devices and personal protective
equipment) and communicate about the incidence and location of infections and ways to halt its spread
(including social distancing and mask wearing), and (3) distribute treatments for the disease. See supra
notes 25–27 and accompanying text.
51. HSC, NATIONAL STRATEGY 2005, supra note 48, at 2 (“Preparing for a pandemic requires the
leveraging of all instruments of national power, and coordinated action by all segments of government and
society.”); see also id. at 4 (noting the importance of coordinated planning); id. at 5 (establishing goal of
facilitating coordination of vaccination manufacturing efforts); id. at 11 (recommending that states and
localities coordinate crisis communication plans).
52. Id. at 8 (noting intention to “develop a coalition of strong partners to coordinate actions to
limit the spread of a virus with pandemic potential beyond the location where it is first recognized in order
to protect U.S. interests abroad”); id. at 9 (referring to the need to coordinate risk communication “to
inform the public and mitigate panic” in the midst of a pandemic); id. at 10 (establishing as a federal
responsibility coordinating the distribution of disease countermeasures “in concert with states and other
entities”).
53.

Pub. L. No. 109-417, 120 Stat. 2832 (2006).

54.

Id. § 101(2) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300hh(a)).

55.

Id. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300hh(b)).

56.

Id. § 101(3) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300hh-10(a), (b)(4)).
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an accompanying implementation plan for public health emergency preparedness and
response.”57
The outbreak of the Ebola virus in 2014 increased attention on the
importance of government organization, and particularly the critical role of
coordination, in promoting effective responses to global health threats.58 In February
2014, then-Secretary of HHS Kathleen Sebelius and the Director-General of the
World Health Organization announced the formation of the Global Health Security
Agenda (“GHSA”).59 Their goal was to accelerate international implementation of
the 2005 International Health Regulations,60 which, among other things, address
public health preparedness and response capacities concerning public health threats.
Later that year, the Congressional Research Service (“CRS”) identified issues for
congressional consideration relating to the GHSA. It noted that there was then no
formal mechanism for convening interagency meetings about implementation of the
GHSA. CRS therefore urged legislators to consider “What agency, if any, should
coordinate these efforts . . . to avoid duplication of efforts and ensure efficient and
effective use of U.S. resources?”61
Consistent with the GHSA’s goals, President Obama decided to enhance
the government’s pandemic management capacity. Some, such as Senator John
McCain, had criticized the Obama Administration for having no one in charge of
coordinating the various independent and at times overlapping federal authorities
involved in Ebola response management and for failing to implement measures such
as imposing travel bans and quarantines.62 According to the Center for Strategic and

57.

Id. § 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300hh-1(a)(1)).

58. See Tsung-Ling Lee, Making International Health Regulations Work: Lessons from the 2014 Ebola
Outbreak, 49 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 931, 937 (2016) (arguing that “the international control of
infectious disease is essentially a coordination game” and using the Ebola crisis as an example). The World
Health Organization, for example, established a Review Committee to “identify the weaknesses in global
preparedness and responses to international health emergencies.” Id.
59. Lisa Monaco, Making the World Safer from Pandemic Threats: A New Agenda for Global Health
Security, THE WHITE HOUSE OF PRESIDENT OBAMA: BLOG (Feb. 13, 2014, 2:05 PM),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2014/02/13/making-world-safer-pandemic-threats-newagenda-global-health-security. The Agenda was an international effort that was designed to enhance
capacity, particularly in resource-poor countries, “to prevent, detect, and respond to outbreaks of infectious
disease threats.” Id.; see also CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10022, The Global Health Security Agenda (2014-2019)
andInternationalHealthRegulations(2005)1(2014),https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF100
22 [hereinafter Global Health Security Agenda].
60.

WORLD HEALTH ORG., INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (2d ed. 2005).

61. Global Health Security Agenda, supra note 59, at 2. Anticipated preparedness and prevention
measures included “improving immunization capacity, . . . improving disease surveillance and monitoring
systems, . . . and developing and disseminating novel diagnostic tools.” Id. To enhance effective outbreak
responses, the Agenda aimed at “creating an interconnected global network of Emergency Operations
Centers, establishing rapid response teams worldwide, operating a global reagent resource, and developing
response communications and crisis planning and management tools.” Id.
62. Deirdre Shesgreen, ‘Gross Misjudgment’: Experts Say Trump’s Decision to Disband Pandemic Team
HinderedCoronavirusResponse,USATODAY(Mar.18,2020,6:00AM),https://www.usatoday.com/story/
news/world/2020/03/18/coronavirus-did-president-trumps-decision-disband-global-pandemic-officehinder-response/5064881002/.
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International Studies (CSIS),63 “in the aftermath of the slow, uncoordinated, and
resource-intensive response to the Ebola crisis in West Africa, the White House
[National Security Council (NSC)] staff created the Global Health Security and
Biodefense Directorate,” which was “[d]esigned to plan for and oversee rapid,
efficient, government-wide responses to global health security threats.”64 The
Directorate would coordinate both pandemic planning and response at all levels of
government.65
According to Beth Cameron, who headed the Directorate as the Senior
Director for Global Health and Biodefense, the Directorate’s mission was “to get
ahead: to accelerate the response, empower experts, anticipate failures, and act
quickly and transparently to solve problems.”66 It served as an “early-warning system
for impending pandemics.”67 The Directorate reported to a senior-level response

63. “[T]he Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is a bipartisan, nonprofit policy
research organization dedicated to providing strategic insights and policy solutions to help decisionmakers
chart a course toward a better world.” CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INT’L STUDIES, ENDING THE CYCLE
OF CRISIS AND COMPLACENCY IN U.S. GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY: A REPORT OF THE CSIS
COMMISSION ON STRENGTHENING AMERICA’S HEALTH SECURITY ii (2019), https://csis-websiteprod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/191122_EndingTheCycle_GHSC_WEB_FULL_
11.22.pdf [hereinafter CSIS, CYCLE OF CRISIS].
64. Id. at 17. The former White House Ebola response coordinator describes the NSC directorate
as a means to “coordinate government-wide pandemic preparedness and response.” Ronald Klain,
CoronavirusIsComing—AndTrumpIsn’tReady,THEATLANTIC(Jan.30,2020),https://www.theatlantic.
com/ideas/archive/2020/01/now-trump-needs-deep-state-fight-coronavirus/605752/;
seealsoNSC
Directorate for Global Health Security and Biodefense Dissolved, COLUMB. U.: SABIN CENTER FOR CLIMATE
CHANGEL.,https://climate.law.columbia.edu/content/nsc-directorate-global-health-security-andbiodefense-dissolved (last visited May 24, 2020); Reuters Examines Changes To CDC, NSC Epidemiology,
Pandemic Response Staff Under Trump Administration, KFF (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.kff.org/newssummary/reuters-examines-changes-to-cdc-nsc-epidemiology-pandemic-response-staff-under-trumpadministration/. At the same time, President Obama issued an executive order to implement the GHSA.
Exec. Order No. 13747, Advancing the Global Health Security Agenda to Achieve a World Safe and
Secure from Infectious Disease Threats, 81 Fed. Reg. 78701 (Nov. 4, 2016). The order created a GHSA
Interagency Review Council whose responsibilities included providing “policy-level guidance to
participating agencies on GHSA goals, objectives, and implementation,” and facilitating “interagency,
multi-sectoral engagement to carry out GHSA implementation.” Id. at 78701. The Obama Administration
recognized the importance of coordination across the federal government to deal with both domestic and
international aspects of pandemic planning and response, directing the federal agencies that comprised
the Council to “coordinate with other agencies that are identified in this order to satisfy programmatic
goals, and further facilitate coordination of country teams, implementers, and donors in host countries.”
Id. at 78703.
65. See Klain, supra note 64; Emily Berman, The Roles of the State and Federal Governments in A
Pandemic, 11 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 61, 66 (2020) (noting that the NSC recognized the
importance of federal leadership during a pandemic and the importance of “employ[ing] the full spectrum
of federal medical and public-health capabilities to support state and local authorities”).
66. Beth Cameron, I Ran the White House Pandemic Office. Trump Closed It., WASH. POST (Mar.
13,2020,9:32AM),https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/nsc-pandemic-office-trumpclosed/2020/03/13/a70de09c-6491-11ea-acca-80c22bbee96f_story.html.
67. Haley Sweetland Edwards, The Trump Administration Fumbled Its Initial Response to Coronavirus.
Is There Enough Time to Fix It?, TIME (Mar. 19, 2020, 6:18 AM), https://time.com/5805683/trumpadministration-coronavirus/.
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coordinator on the NSC staff, the National Security Adviser, and the homeland
security adviser.68
The Directorate’s ability to manage a pandemic response was never tested
because the Trump Administration disbanded it before the outbreak of COVID-19.69
But the Obama Administration’s 69-page playbook suggests that had the NSC’s
Directorate been in existence, it would have been empowered and fairly well-poised
to lead a coordinated effort to respond to the pandemic.70 The Playbook included a
“decision-making rubric” for domestic assessment and response that committed the
U.S. government to “use all powers at its disposal to prevent, slow, or mitigate the
spread of an emerging infectious disease threat” by limiting spread of disease,
mitigating the impact of illness and death, and sustaining critical infrastructure and
key domestic resources.71 The NSC (acting through the Directorate) would “serve as
an information conduit for the Executive Office of the President (EOP) and w[ould]
coordinate interagency policy discussions and decisions.”72 Notably, and in contrast
to the Trump Administration’s approach,73 the Playbook stated that “[w]hile States
hold significant power and responsibility related to public health response . . . , the
American public will look to the U.S. Government for action when multi-state or
other significant public health events occur.”74 The Playbook included a detailed grid
setting forth the somewhat distinct and somewhat overlapping responsibilities of
various federal agencies with respect to pathogen identification, initial response
activation, resource distribution, and long-term recovery operations.75
A review of the Obama Directorate’s actions between 2016 and 2018 also
suggested that it had the potential to head up a successful effort. Beth Cameron
described the Directorate’s role as coordinating both preparations for a pandemic and
coordinating “a robust and seamless domestic and global response” when a pandemic
developed.76 Cameron highlighted the capacity of the Directorate “to prepare the
United States and the world for the next pandemic, including by developing
incentives for global leaders and governments to rapidly finance and fill identified

68.

Cameron, supra note 66; CSIS, CYCLE OF CRISIS, supra note 63, at 17.

69.

See infra notes 88–103 and accompanying text.

70. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., PLAYBOOK FOR EARLY RESPONSE TO
HIGH-CONSEQUENCE EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE THREATS AND BIOLOGICAL INCIDENTS 4
[hereinafter PLAYBOOK] (“[T]he National Security Council (NSC) and its subordinate policy committees
. . . will serve as the principal forum for consideration of national security policy issues, including emerging
infectious disease-related national security threats.”). “The U.S. government international and domestic
responses to evolving public health crises should be coordinated, as appropriate, through the NSC’s
coordination mechanisms.” Id. at 12.
71.

Id. at 31.

72.

Id.

73.

See infra notes 88–103 and accompanying text.

74.

PLAYBOOK, supra note 70, at 31.

75.

Id. at 32–40.

76.

Cameron, supra note 66.
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gaps.”77 The Directorate was charged with coordinating several important
governmental functions, including information gathering, funding, and planning.78
Had a pandemic developed during the Obama Administration, the Directorate would
also have been responsible for coordinating implementation of responses at all
governmental levels. For example, it “would have been responsible for coordinating
the efforts of multiple federal agencies to make sure the government was
backstopping testing capacity, devising approaches to manufacture and avoid
shortages of personal protective equipment, strengthening U.S. lab capacity to
process covid-19 tests, and expanding the health-care workforce.”79 Before its
elimination, the Directorate began to implement its planning mission. For example,
it coordinated efforts by federal agencies to monitor evolving outbreaks of diseases
such as yellow fever and H7N9 influenza so that it could trigger alarms if an outbreak
seemed problematic. It also coordinated international funding, providing financing
to fill gaps in other nations’ preparedness or response capacities.80
In the wake of the Ebola outbreak, Congress also recognized, and acted on,
the need for a coordinated government response to global public health threats. At
the end of 2016, Congress enacted the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2017, which directed the Secretaries of Defense, HHS, Homeland Security, and
Agriculture to jointly develop a national biodefense strategy and associated
implementation plan.81 The required contents of the strategy and plan include (1) “a
77. Id.; see also Klarman, supra note 3, at 100 (describing the Directorate’s mission as “preventing
or preparing for the next pandemic”).
78.

See Edwards, supra note 67.

79. Cameron, supra note 66; see also id. (“It would identify needs among state and local officials,
and advise and facilitate regular, focused communication from federal health and scientific experts to
provide states and the public with fact-based tools to minimize the virus’s spread . . . It would be in charge
of sharing information and coordinating our public health and humanitarian response with partners and
allies.”).
80.

Id.

81. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-238, § 1086, 130
Stat. 2000, 2423–24 (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 104). The Trump Administration published the documents
required by the 2017 Act about a year after the statutory deadline, perhaps losing valuable time in
preparing for the crisis about to occur. The statutory deadline for submission of the strategy to Congress
was 275 days after enactment of the 2017 Act (i.e., July 2017). Id. § 1086(c). The Administration released
the strategy in September 2018. See Presidential Memorandum on the Support for National Biodefense
(Sept. 18, 2018), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-memorandumsupport-national-biodefense/; DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL BIODEFENSE STRATEGY 2018 i,
https://www.dhs.gov/coronavirus/presidents-biodefense-strategy. National Security Presidential
Memorandum 14, issued a month after the release of the Strategy, ordered agencies, under the leadership
of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, “to ensure an integrated, comprehensive
approach” and to “coordinate and manage biodefense activities in support of the broader biodefense
enterprise.” Posting of the National Security Presidential Memorandum 14, “Support for National
Biodefense,” 83 Fed. Reg. 52841, 52842 (Oct. 18, 2018). Among other things, it also directed all federal
agencies to coordinate biodefense policy formulation and information dissemination among themselves
and non-federal entities, and to “monitor, evaluate, and hold their agencies accountable for
implementation of the Strategy,” and delegated to the Secretary of HHS the task of ensuring that
appropriate resources are provided to a Biodefense Coordination Team located within HHS. Id.
Unfortunately, as indicated below, the implementation of those coordination mandates left much to be
desired.
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description of the roles and responsibilities of executive agencies, including internal
and external coordination procedures, in identifying and sharing information” about
terrorist use of biological agents and weapons, and biological outbreaks; (2) an
articulation of interagency capabilities and “whole-of-Government” activities
required to support the strategy; (3) recommendations for strengthening biodefense
capabilities, authorities, and command structures; and (4) improving and formalizing
interagency coordination to provide “a robust national biodefense.”82 The Act
mandated submission by the Secretaries of the strategy and plan to appropriate
congressional committees.83
Perhaps different or additional organizational choices could have improved
on the framework created by the Obama Administration and Congress. But the
organizational changes they endorsed all reflected an understanding, which has since
been reinforced by the assessment from both former Obama and Trump
Administration public health experts, that coordination of decentralized and largely
independent federal and state authority is an indispensable element of effective
government planning for and responses to wide-ranging public health crises.84
Designed well, coordination can (1) promote more efficient response efforts by
pooling resources and expertise, (2) enhance accountability by identifying and
assigning governmental roles to reflect differing expertise and capacities and avoid
duplication of effort, and (3) harmonize the efforts of different governmental bodies
to foster synergies and avoid conflicts.85 Unfortunately, the striking lack of
coordination in the Trump Administration’s response to COVID-19 squandered all
of these opportunities.

IV.THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION: DELAY, DISBANDMENT,
CONSOLIDATION, AND TRIPLICATE AUTHORITY
As Part II above indicates, government authority to deal with social
problems such as public health emergencies is necessarily comprised of one or more
82.

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, § 1086(b).

83.

Id. § 1086(c).

84. See Elisabeth Belmont et al., Emergency Preparedness, Response & Recovery Checklist: Beyond the
Emergency Management Plan, 37 J. HEALTH L. 503, 508–09 (2004) (urging coordination among public
health agencies and between such agencies and private health care providers, and suggesting “ad hoc
restructuring of an organization around functional (rather than administrative) lines to better meet the
demands of a given emergency situation”); Michael Greenberger, The Alfonse and Gaston of Governmental
Response to National Public Health Emergencies: Lessons Learned from Hurricane Katrina for the Federal
Government and the States, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 611, 612 (2006) (“The recent devastation and destruction
by Hurricane Katrina in August 2005 in the Gulf Coast exemplifies the critical need for better federal,
state, and local government coordination during a catastrophic public health emergency. Relying on only
one or two of these governmental entities, or an uncoordinated response by all three, to spearhead disaster
relief on a national scale only exacerbates the disaster, costing thousands of lives and billions of dollars.”);
cf. Lori L. Buchsbaum, The U.S. Public Health Response to Bioterrorism: Need for A Stronger Legislative
Approach, 7 MICH. ST. U.J. MED. & L. 1, 15 (2002) (emphasizing “the importance of coordination among
states and between state and federal governments in facing threats such as bioterrorism”).
85.

See CAMACHO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 13, at 44–45.
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governmental functions allocated along each of three different dimensions.86
Unfortunately, the Trump Administration’s planning for and response to the
COVID-19 pandemic was poorly structured along each of these dimensions. It was
characterized by (1) an illogical combination of more centralized planning and
decentralized response authority that failed to leverage the beneficial aspects of
either; (2) particularly for pandemic response, a toxic mix of haphazard overlap and
poorly delineated authority to different policymakers within the executive branch;
and (3) a crippling lack of coordination in planning and response, both within the
federal government and between the federal government, state, and local
governments and the private sector. The upshot was a delayed, confusing, and
ineffective effort to combat the virus and hundreds of thousands of potentially
avoidable illnesses and deaths.87

A. Disbandment and Consolidation of Planning and Response
The Trump Administration took steps along the centralizationdecentralization dimension that adversely affected its ability to plan for and respond
to COVID-19. In the context of pandemic planning, the Administration dissolved
an entity whose mission was focused on pandemic planning and response and
ostensibly merged its responsibilities into an entity with a broader set of
responsibilities, thus diluting the attention that might otherwise have been devoted
to pandemic management. Second, the Administration largely defaulted on
pandemic response, resulting in a decentralized effort led by states and localities that
cried out for, but that was lacking, federal coordination.

1.

Centralization and Dilution of Federal Planning

In March 2018, President Trump appointed John Bolton as head of the
National Security Council, replacing H.R. McMaster.88 The day after Bolton took
over, National Security Advisor Thomas Bossert resigned at Bolton’s request.89

86. Allocations may but need not differ for various government functions. In Part V below, we
suggest that policymakers would be well advised to consider differentiating authority along each of the
dimensions for two different functions relating to pandemic management—planning and response (or plan
implementation).
87. See James Glanz & Campbell Robertson, Lockdown Delays Cost at Least 36,000 Lives, Data Show,
N.Y.TIMES(May20,2020),https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/20/us/coronavirus-distancingdeaths.html (describing how growth of the pandemic could have been better controlled with a more timely
and effective federal response).
88. Cristiano Lima & Matthew Nussbaum, John Bolton To Replace H.R. McMaster as National
Security Adviser, POLITICO (Mar. 22, 2018, 7:41 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/03/22/johnbolton-national-security-adviser-hr-mcmaster-trump-481721.
89. Josh Dawsey, Greg Jaffe, & Ellen Nakashima, White House Homeland Security Adviser Tom
Bossert Resigns, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2018, 9:19 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/white-
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Bossert had urged greater investment90 in global health security91 and called for “a
comprehensive biodefense strategy against pandemics and biological attacks.”92
Within weeks, Bolton dismissed Rear Admiral Timothy Ziemer, who had taken over
Beth Cameron’s position as head of the Global Health Security and Biodefense
Directorate in 2017 and was the person responsible for overseeing preparation of the
biodefense strategy required under the 2017 Defense Authorization Act.93
But Bolton did more than just reshuffle personnel. He also quickly
disbanded the Directorate itself.94 Bolton believed that the NSC’s organizational
chart made little sense, that it created too many conflicts among its components, and
that the NSC staff had grown too large.95 Some of the Directorate’s authority was
shifted to a now-consolidated counter-proliferation and biodefense directorate. The
refashioned Directorate’s jurisdiction fused weapon arms control and
nonproliferation, anti-terrorism matters, and global health and biodefense.96 The
Trump Administration alleged that the changes were meant to “streamline” a
“bloated” and leak-prone NSC.97 Some officials also justified the changes as an effort
to “combine a handful of offices with similar mission sets.”98 One asserted (with no
substantiation) that the combined directorate was an improvement because it would
allow for the “commingl[ing]” of ostensibly related expertise.99 It has since become

house-homeland-security-adviser-resigns-amid-continued-turnover-in-trump-administration/2018/04/10
/15db518a-3ccb-11e8-a7d1-e4efec6389f0_story.html.
90. See Lauren Weber, Sudden Departure of White House Global Health Security Head Has Experts
Worried, HUFFPOST (May 9, 2018, 7:26 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/tim-ziemer-global-healthsecurity-leaves_n_5af37dfbe4b0859d11d02290.
91. See Jonathan Landay, White House Developing Comprehensive Biosecurity Strategy: Official,
REUTERS(July20,2017,2:26PM),https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-security-biodefenseidUSKBN1A52HZ.
92. Lena H. Sun, Top White House Official in Charge of Pandemic Response Exits Abruptly, WASH.
POST(May10,2018,4:32PM),https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2018/05/10/
top-white-house-official-in-charge-of-pandemic-response-exits-abruptly/.
93. Ed Yong, Ebola Returns Just as the White House Loses Its Top Biodefense Expert, THE ATLANTIC
(May 11, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2018/05/white-house-loses-global-healthsecurity-lead-as-a-new-ebola-outbreak-hits/560195/.
94. See CSIS, CYCLE OF CRISIS, supra note 63, at 17–18; Tal Axelrod, Bolton Defends Decision to
ShutterNSCPandemicOffice,THEHILL(Mar.14,2020,11:59AM),https://thehill.com/homenews/admi
nistration/487581-bolton-defends-decision-to-shutter-nsc-pandemic-office.
95. Glenn Kessler & Meg Kelly, Was the White House Office for Global Pandemics Eliminated?,
WASH. POST (Mar. 20, 2020, 2:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/03/20/waswhite-house-office-global-pandemics-eliminated/.
96.

See CSIS, CYCLE OF CRISIS, supra note 63, at 17–18.

Klain, supra note 64; Partly False Claim: Trump Fired Entire Pandemic Response Team in 2018,
REUTERS (Mar. 25, 2020, 2:07 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-factcheck-trump-firedpandemic-team/partly-false-claim-trump-fired-pandemic-response-team-in-2018-idUSKBN21C32M
[hereinafter Partly False Claim].
97.

98.

Yong, supra note 93; see also Partly False Claim, supra note 97.

99. Tim Morrison, Opinion, No, the White House Didn’t ‘Dissolve’ Its Pandemic Response Office. I Was
There.,WASH.POST(Mar.16,2020,1:37PM),https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/03/16/
no-white-house-didnt-dissolve-its-pandemic-response-office/.
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clear, however, that the decision to eliminate the pandemic Directorate had
considerable downsides.
The Trump Administration’s merger of the Obama Directorate into an
entity with responsibilities relating to weapons of mass destruction and terrorist
threats moved federal pandemic planning in the direction of greater federal
centralization of authority to tackle a broad range of crisis management issues. This
move to increase centralization needlessly sacrificed core benefits of decentralization,
which include leveraging the expertise, diversity, and accountability advantages of
decentralized authorities while maintaining coherent implementation. In contrast,
combining epidemic prevention and response with managing matters relating to
weapons of mass destruction and terrorism threats runs the risk of subordinating
concerns about the risks associated with naturally spread diseases to preparation for
intentional attacks.100 Indeed, some observers saw the dismantling of the Obama
pandemic response Directorate as a signal that its work was not a priority of the
Trump Administration.101 One expert claimed that the Trump Administration’s
“approach to NSC ‘streamlining’ involved decapitating and diluting the White
House’s focus on pandemic threats.”102
Others with experience or expertise on pandemic responses expressed
similar concerns, concluding that the disbanding of the pandemic-specific unit within
NSC was apt to hinder the United States’ response to COVID-19.103 In its 2019
report on Strengthening America’s Health Security, CSIS, a bipartisan, nonprofit policy
research organization, identified as its first critical reform recommendation for
strategic investment in pandemic prevention, protection, and resilience the
restoration of “health security leadership” at the NSC.104 Likewise, in February 2020,
twenty-seven members of the Senate wrote a letter to the Assistant to the President
on National Affairs urging the President to fill the vacancy resulting from Admiral
Ziemer’s departure.105
Perhaps the most revealing comment, however, came from Dr. Anthony
Fauci, the Director of the National Institutes of Health’s National Institute of
Allergy and Infectious Diseases, and one of the main faces of the Trump
100. Cf. Hunter Knapp, Managing an Administrative Emergency: Establishing FEMA As an Independent
Agency, 31 COLO. NAT. RES, ENERGY & ENV’T L. REV. 231, 241 (2020) (arguing that movement of the
Federal Emergency Management Agency into the Department of Homeland Security after 9/11
subordinated the role of natural disaster preparedness, which “proved costly when Hurricane Katrina
struck the Gulf Coast in 2005”).
101. Dozier & Bergengruen, supra note 4.
102. Shesgreen, supra note 62.
103. Laura Strickler & Ken Dilanian, Trump Cuts to National Security Staff May Hurt Coronavirus
Response,FormerOfficialsSay,NBCNEWS(Feb.26,2020,5:00PM),https://www.nbcnews.com/health/h
ealth-news/trump-cuts-national-security-staff-may-hurt-coronavirus-response-say-n1143656.
104. CSIS, CYCLE OF CRISIS, supra note 63, at 17–18.
105. See Letter from U.S. Senate to Robert O’Brien, Assistant to the President for Nat’l Sec. Affairs
(Feb.13,2020),https://www.schatz.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/021320%20NSC%20Novel%20Coronavir
us%20Letter%20final%20pdf.pdf. The letter was written after thirteen cases of COVID-19 had already
been diagnosed in the United States. Id.
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Administration’s COVID-19 response, at least until the President became
disillusioned with his prominence and advice.106 Dr. Fauci admitted that “[i]t would
be nice if [the NSC pandemic-response office] was still there.”107 The Trump
Administration later implicitly acknowledged its mistake by initiating efforts to
reestablish a dedicated pandemic response unit. It considered locating the unit at the
State Department rather than the NSC, perhaps to reduce the perception that it
understood it had erred in disbanding the Directorate in the first place and was
simply reverting to the Obama Administration’s approach.108 After his election,
incoming President Biden’s transition team issued a Plan to Combat Coronavirus
(COVID-19) that promised to “[i]mmediately restore the White House National
Security Council Directorate for Global Health Security and Biodefense, which was
established by the Obama-Biden Administration and eliminated by the Trump
Administration in 2018.”109 On his first day in office, President Biden issued an
executive order that made good on that promise.110

106. See, e.g., Yasmeen Abutaleb et al., The Inside Story of How Trump’s Denial, Mismanagement and
MagicalThinkingLedtothePandemic’sDarkWinter,WASH.POST(Dec.19,2020),https://www.washingto
npost.com/graphics/2020/politics/trump-covid-pandemic-dark-winter/ (“The president and some on his
team were also increasingly frustrated with Fauci, who frequently appeared in the media offering what
they viewed as an overly alarmist public health message.”).
107. Dozier & Bergengruen, supra note 4.
108. See Kylie Atwood & Nicole Gaouette, Trump Administration Moves Ahead with Plan to Open
New Pandemic Office as Coronavirus Crisis Intensifies, CNN POL. (July 2, 2020, 8:13 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/02/politics/trump-state-dept-new-pandemic-office/index.html (“Former
officials say the administration could have been better prepared for the pandemic if it had left the original
office in place instead of trying to replicate it even as the virus gained new ground.”). Lisa Monaco, who,
as President Obama’s National Security Adviser, oversaw the creation of the NSC’s directorate, explained
that placing the unit within the NSC facilitated policy coordination across the entire government. Id. She
characterized the Trump Administration’s plan to reestablish the unit as a “recognition that you do indeed
need a specific identified place to constantly be focusing on pandemic response,” but she feared that
placing it in the State Department rather than under White House control would replicate the failure of
the Trump HHS task force under Secretary Azar to achieve effective government-wide coordination. Id.
See also Michael Igoe, Exclusive: State Department Makes Bid for U.S. Global Pandemic Response Powers,
DEVEX (May 22, 2020), https://www.devex.com/news/exclusive-state-department-makes-bid-for-usglobal-pandemic-response-powers-97315 (discussing proposed initiative, the President’s Response to
Outbreaks, to be run by the State Department).
109. The Biden Plan to Combat Coronavirus (COVID-19) and Prepare for Future Global Health Threats,
BIDENHARRIS, https://joebiden.com/covid-plan/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2021) [hereinafter Biden Plan].
Moreover, Biden chose Beth Cameron, who as head of the Directorate wrote the Obama Administration’s
pandemic playbook, to return as the head of the restored Directorate. Karen DeYoung, Biden’s NSC to
Focus on Global Health, Climate, Cyber and Human Rights, As Well As China and Russia, WASH. POST (Jan.
8, 2021, 6:30 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/biden-nsc-covid-climate-cyberchina/2021/01/08/85a31cba-5158-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
110. Exec. Order No. 13987, Organizing and Mobilizing the United States Government To
Provide a Unified and Effective Response To Combat COVID-19 and To Provide United States
Leadership on Global Health and Security, § 3(b), 86 Fed. Reg. 7109 (Jan. 20, 2021) (“There shall be an
NSC Directorate on Global Health Security and Biodefense, which shall be headed by a Senior Director
for Global Health Security and Biodefense.”). The order also created within the Executive Office of the
President a new Coordinator of the COVID-19 Response and Counselor to the President whose functions
included “coordinat[ing] all elements of the COVID-19 response.” Id. § 2(a). The order requires the
Directorate to report to the Coordinator on matters relating to COVID-19. Id. § 3(b).
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The diminished profile and responsibility of the NSC, which housed the
consolidated directorate that emerged from John Bolton’s reorganization efforts, also
took its toll. For example, NSC sponsored the first interagency meeting on the
outbreak in mid-January 2020, which it followed up two weeks later with a meeting
of the NSC deputies committee.111 Whatever recommendations emerged from those
meetings seem to have gotten lost amid the many other voices speaking for the
Administration and crafting its pandemic response policy.

2.

Federal Abdication in Pandemic Response

In a different sense, the Trump Administration’s approach was also more
decentralized than the Obama Administration’s strategy: federal leadership of state
and local government pandemic response was sorely lacking.112 Some decentralization
is necessary to deal with a pandemic that affects various parts of the country
differently at different times.113 As the pandemic worsened, for example, state
governors were among the most important officials in crafting pandemic response
policy.114 Decentralized authority leverages the expertise of state and local officials
to respond in ways that meet local conditions and needs. It also allows these
governments to experiment with different approaches so that the more successful
ones can be tried elsewhere.115
111. See Josh Rogin, Opinion, The National Security Council Sounded Early Alarms About the
Coronavirus,WASH.POST(Mar.30,2020,4:40PM),https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/0
3/30/national-security-council-sounded-early-alarms-about-coronavirus/.
112. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 65, at 79 (“Presidential statements disclaiming responsibility. . .
and encouraging governors to defy the White House’s own guidelines . . . left the clear impression that
the President had no interest in bringing the federal government’s powers to bear in executing the basic
blocking and tackling needed for a successful response.”).
113. See, e.g., Gable, supra note 32, at 455 (urging adoption of “an integrated pluralistic governance
strategy” to public health emergencies “to greatly enhance the resiliency and flexibility of public health
emergency response systems”). Moreover, the legality of a hierarchical federal response system is unclear.
For example, the scope of the federal government’s authority to issue a nationwide quarantine order that
binds the states is uncertain. Compare Maryam Jamshidi, The Federal Government Probably Can’t Order
Statewide Quarantines, U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE, Apr. 2020, at 1 (2020) (asserting that the federal
government lacks such authority) with 42 U.S.C. § 264(a) (“The Surgeon General . . . is authorized to
make and enforce such regulations as in his judgment are necessary to prevent the introduction,
transmission, or spread of communicable diseases from foreign countries into the States or possessions, or
from one State or possession into any other State or possession.”). For arguments in favor of enhanced
federal authority to require social distancing and mask wearing, see Lindsay F. Wiley, Democratizing the
Law of Social Distancing, YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS, 2020, at 50.
114. See, e.g., Maeve Reston, Kristina Sgueglia, & Cheri Mossburg, Governors on East and West
Coasts Form Pacts to Decide When to Reopen Economies, CNN POL. (Apr. 13, 2020, 7:10 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/13/politics/states-band-together-reopening-plans/index.html (reporting
that governors of states on both coasts engaged in coordinated planning to re-open economies in ways that
limit new outbreaks of coronavirus). But cf. Eang L. Ngov, Under Containment: Preempting State Ebola
Quarantine Regulations, 88 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 28–29 (2015) (describing reasons identified by investigators
following an outbreak of cholera in New York for the development of a uniform federal quarantine
system).
115. See CAMACHO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 13, at 34–35 (identifying these advantages of
decentralized allocations of authority); cf. Fernanda Nicola & Gino Scaccia, The Italian Model to Fight
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Despite these advantages, however, decentralization is not necessarily
desirable in all contexts and for all governmental functions. There is substantial
evidence that the federal government during the Trump Administration abdicated,
or at least neglected, its role in pandemic response, leading to a largely ineffective,
decentralized effort. According to one observer, “[e]ven after containment was
impossible, early adoption of a uniform federal plan that acknowledged the severity
of the crisis and provided mitigation guidelines for state public-health officials and
ordinary citizens might have lessened the virus’s impact.”116 Indeed, the President
resisted using his authority under the Defense Production Act117 “to spur additional
production of scarce medical supplies and centralized their procurement and
distribution.”118 Federal acquisition of medical supplies could have taken advantage
of economies of scale and ensured distribution according to need.119 The Trump
Administration also refused to take charge of testing and contact tracing efforts that
could have slowed the spread of the virus.120 It declined to make sure that clear and
accurate information about the virus was available to all.121 In all these respects, the
COVID-19: Regional Cooperation, Regulatory Inflation, and the Cost of One-Size-Fits-All Lockdown Measures,
73 ADMIN. L. REV. 53, 72 (2021) (discussing the Italian government’s successful adoption of “a more
tailored and decentralized approach, giving more space to the regions” after initially deploying an approach
that responded to COVID in a uniform manner, even though the outbreak was far more severe in northern
than southern Italy).
116. Berman, supra note 65, at 79.
117. Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. §§ 4501–4568.
118. Berman, supra note 65, at 80; see also Caroline Hopkins, “We Are Desperate”: Trump’s Inaction
HasCreatedaCrisiswithProtectiveMedicalGear,VOX(Mar.23,2020,10:12AM),https://www.vox.com/
2020/3/22/21189896/coronavirus-in-us-masks-n95-respirator-doctors-nurses-shortage-ppe.
119. Ed Yong, How the Pandemic Defeated America, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 4, 2020, 1:12 PM),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/09/coronavirus-american-failure/614191/
[hereinafter Yong, Defeated].
120. See Berman, supra note 65, at 81, 82 (bemoaning the absence of a “comprehensive national plan
for assessing the need for and distributing [personal protective equipment] and other supplies or for
developing the surveillance and testing capacities that experts insist are needed to keep the virus under
control”); Michael Gerson, Opinion, The Lessons We Need to Draw from Covid-19, WASH. POST (Feb. 19,
2021,5:54PM),https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/six-takeaways-from-covid-19-that-couldshape-our-future/2021/02/18/667c5196-722b-11eb-85fa-e0ccb3660358_story.html(arguingthat
decentralization is “bad health policy,” and noting that “[]he federal government initially failed to provide
adequate support for testing and contact tracing, [and] failed to effectively distribute medical supplies and
equipment, failed to standardize epidemic data”); Rachel Weiner, Trump Administration’s Approach to
TestingIsChaoticandUnhelpful,StatesSay,WASH.POST(July9,2020,11:55AM),https://www.washingt
onpost.com/health/trump-administrations-approach-to-testing-is-chaotic-and-unhelpful-statessay/2020/07/09/66a4b08a-c1e8-11ea-b4f6-cb39cd8940fb_story.html (repeating criticisms by Democratic
leaders that “[t]he Trump Administration’s erratic approach to testing for the novel coronavirus has left
state leaders and commercial laboratories confused, frustrated, and unprepared”).
121. Yong, Defeated, supra note 119. For example, the White House Coronavirus Task Force
informed the states after the 2020 presidential election that it would stop sending weekly reports to the
states with current information on the incidence of the virus and recommendations on how to respond to
it, notwithstanding the explosion of new cases that were spurred by the virus’s second wave. Betsy Klein,
White House Coronavirus Task Force No Longer Proactively Sending to the States, CNN POL. (Dec. 23, 2020,
10:18 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/12/23/politics/white-house-coronavirus-state-reports/index.html.
Earlier, the White House had ordered federal health officials to treat the Task Force’s meetings as
classified, which, according to some of the Trump Administration’s own officials, “restricted information
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Administration was content to leave the bulk of planning and response responsibility
to lower levels of government and to the private sector.
The same unwillingness to lead the response effort surfaced in the
distribution of coronavirus vaccines late in 2020. According to public health officials,
“federal officials have left many of the details of the final stage of the vaccine
distribution process, such as scheduling and staffing, to overstretched local health
officials and hospitals.”122 President Trump himself tweeted that it was “up to the
States to distribute the vaccines once brought to the designated areas by the Federal
Government.”123 The dean of Brown University’s School of Public Health,
commenting on this policy, remarked that “[w]e’ve taken the people with the least
amount of resources and capacity and asked them to do the hardest part of the
vaccination — which is actually getting the vaccines administered into people’s
arms.”124 The dean also charged that, “[u]timately, the buck seems to stop with no
one.”125 The Administration’s “hands off” approach sacrificed the uniformity,
economies of scale, and resource pooling advantages that centralized pandemic
response authority might have been capable of providing.126

and hampered the U.S. government’s response to the contagion.” Aram Roston & Marisa Taylor,
Exclusive: White House Told Federal Health Agency to Classify Coronavirus Deliberations – Sources, REUTERS
(Mar.11,2020,12:29PM),https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-secrecyexclusive/exclusive-white-house-told-federal-health-agency-to-classify-coronavirus-deliberationssources-idUSKBN20Y2LM.
122. Rebeca Robbins, Frances Robles, & Tim Arango, Here’s Why Distribution of the Vaccine Is Taking
Longer Than Expected, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/31/health/vaccinedistribution-delays.html.
123. Id. See also Margaret Riley, Can Biden Fix the Vaccine Mess? An Expert Says Yes, THE
CONVERSATION (Jan, 27, 2021, 8:28 AM), https://theconversation.com/can-biden-fix-the-vaccine-messan-expert-says-yes-153876 (“In President Donald Trump’s view, the federal government’s job was to
deliver the vaccine to the states. After that, states were largely on their own. And the cash-strapped states
have been ill-prepared to figure it out.”).
124. Robbins, Robles, & Arango, supra note 122.
125. Id. See also id. (reporting that Maryland Governor Larry Hogan attributed the slow vaccination
process to “the federal government not sending as many doses as initially predicted” and to “the lack of
logistical and financial support for local health departments”); Rebecca Robbins, Frances Robles, & Tim
Arango, Vaccinations Lag as States Tackle Logistical Woes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2021, at A1,
https://static01.nyt.com/images/2021/01/01/nytfrontpage/scan.pdf; Michael D. Shear, Maggie
Haberman, Noah Weiland, Sharon LaFraniere, & Mark Mazzetti, Trump’s Focus As the Pandemic Raged:
WhatWouldItMeanforHim?,N.Y.TIMES(Dec.31,2020),https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/31/us/pol
itics/trump-coronavirus.html (reporting that Vice-President Pence stated at a press briefing that “‘decision
making at the local level’ was key, continuing a long pattern of the administration seeking to push
responsibility to the states”). Sources within the Biden Administration described their shock at “a
complete lack of a vaccine distribution strategy under former President Trump, even weeks after multiple
vaccines were approved for use in the United States.” MJ Lee, Biden Inheriting Nonexistent Coronavirus
Vaccine Distribution Plan and Must Start ‘Form Scratch,’ Sources Say, CNN (Jan. 21, 2021, 5:08 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/21/politics/biden-covid-vaccination-trump/index.html.Oneofficial
remarked that “There is nothing for us to rework. We are going to have to build everything from scratch.”
Id.
126. See CAMACHO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 13, at 35–37.
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B. Overlapping and Unaccountable Authority
Like each polar end of the three dimensions of authority, overlapping
authority has the potential to provide advantages that include enhanced
programmatic effectiveness through the creation of a safety net against inaction and
greater resistance to agency capture.127 The experience of federal authority over
pandemic planning highlights some of these key benefits. However, overlap is not
always advantageous, in that it can impair accountability and create conflicting
mandates or advice.128 Existing federal authority over public health emergency
response activities illustrates key problems with such an allocation.

1.

Overlap in Federal Pandemic Planning

There was significant overlap in planning authority before the pandemic,
both among federal agencies, and between the federal government and state
governments. Various federal statutes assign planning roles concerning public health
emergencies to a host of federal officials. The Disaster Relief Act Amendments of
1974 authorizes the President to establish a program of disaster preparedness,
including preparation of disaster preparedness plans.129 The statute also directs the
President to establish a federal interagency task force for “coordinating the
implementation of predisaster hazard mitigation programs administered by the
Federal government.”130 As noted above,131 PAPHA delegated to the Secretary of
HHS the responsibility of preparing once every four years a National Health
Security Strategy for public health preparedness and response.132 It also required the
HHS Secretary to establish an interagency agreement with four specified cabinet
secretaries and “the head of any other relevant Federal agency” that would govern
HHS’s distinct operational control of emergency public health and medical response
127. See id. at 41–43.
128. See id. at 40–41 (“Multiple bodies of regulation require tracking and complying with disparate
and potentially conflicting sets of obligations . . . [S]ome contend that regulator accountability may be
diminished . . . where authority is shared . . . Agencies may shirk their responsibilities, blaming coregulators.”).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 5131(a). For a list of the presidential directives, federal statutes, and treaties
relating to biodefense matters as of 2015, see BIPARTISAN COMM’N ON BIODEFENSE, BLUE RIBBON
STUDY PANEL ON BIODEFENSE, A NATIONAL BLUEPRINT FOR BIODEFENSE: LEADERSHIP AND MAJOR
REFORMNEEDEDTOOPTIMIZEEFFORTS14(2015),https://biodefensecommission.org/wp-content
/uploads/2015/10/NationalBluePrintNov2018-03.pdf [hereinafter BLUEPRINT FOR BIODEFENSE]. One of
the panel’s recommendations was to create a Biodefense Coordination Council at the White House “to
create cohesion among departments, agencies, states, localities, territories, tribes, and industry.” Id. at 12.
The creation of the Obama Directorate within the NSC in 2016 essentially implemented that
recommendation.
130. 42 U.S.C. § 5134(a).
131. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
132. 42 U.S.C. § 300hh-1(a)(1).
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assets in the event of a public health emergency.133 In the same year as it adopted
PAPHA, Congress included in the Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act a requirement that the Administrator of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) “provide Federal leadership necessary to prepare for,
protect against, respond to, recover from, or mitigate against a natural disaster.”134
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 directed the Secretaries
of Defense, HHS, Homeland Security, and Agriculture to “jointly develop a national
biodefense strategy and associated implementation plan” that, among other things,
describes the roles of federal agencies in protecting against biodefense threats,
including “naturally occurring infectious diseases.”135 In addition, all of these statutes
require integration of federal planning mechanisms with state and local public health
planning authorities.136 None, however, specifies whether the jointly developed plans
or strategies should assign distinct roles to the participating agencies or should reflect
the exercise of overlapping implementation responsibilities. In other words, the
planning itself is designed to involve overlapping authority, but the statute appears
to leave to the discretion of the planning entities whether implementation should
also reflect overlapping authority or instead should assign distinct duties.
These statutory directives generated a host of federal plans for managing
public health emergencies such as viral pandemics. In 2005 and 2006, for example,
the White House Homeland Security Council issued pandemic influenza plans.137
The 2005 Strategy identified leadership roles for particular federal agencies, but by
calling them lead agencies, the plans contemplated that other federal (and state)
agencies would engage in some of the same activities.138 Likewise, the 2006
Implementation Plan specified different coordinating roles for eight cabinet
secretaries. This plan placed the HHS Secretary in charge of coordinating federal
with state, local, and tribal action.139 Other secretaries’ roles involved distinct federal

133. Id. § 300hh(b).
134. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-295, § 611(12),
120 Stat. 1355, 1398 (2007) (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 314(a)).
135. 6 U.S.C. § 104(a)–(b).
136. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300hh-1(b)(1)(A) (concerning “evaluation of Federal, State, local, and
tribal preparedness and response capabilities through drills and exercises”); id. § 300hh-1(b)(2) (requiring
that the National Health Security Strategy “develop[] and sustain[] Federal, State, local, and tribal
essential public health security capabilities”); id. § 300hh-1(b)(9) (requiring that this Strategy improve
“coordination among Federal, State, local, Tribal, and territorial entities . . . to prevent, detect, and
respond to [disease] outbreaks”); 42 U.S.C. § 5131(a)(5) (directing the President to include in a program
of disaster preparedness coordinated federal, state, and local preparedness programs).
137. HSC, NATIONAL STRATEGY 2005, supra note 48; HOMELAND SEC. COUNCIL, NATIONAL
STRATEGYFORPANDEMICINFLUENZAIMPLEMENTATIONPLAN(2006),https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pan
demic-resources/pdf/pandemic-influenza-implementation.pdf [hereinafter HSC, IMPLEMENTATION
PLAN 2006].
138. See HSC, NATIONAL STRATEGY 2005, supra note 48, at 10 (specifying that HHS would be
the lead agency for medical response and that DHS would be the lead agency for “overall domestic incident
management and Federal coordination”).
139. HSC, IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 2006, supra note 137, at 29.
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coordination of private sector activities.140 In 2007, CDC issued planning guidance
on strategies for pandemic mitigation by state, territorial, tribal, and local
communities, but the plan indicated that it was the joint work product of HHS and
“other Federal agencies.”141 HHS issued a pandemic influenza plan in 2017, updating
a similar plan adopted in 2009.142 That plan stated that it “builds a vision together
with many partners,” including state and local governments and other federal
agencies.143 HHS’s Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response issued a
national health security strategy and implementation plan covering 2015–2018.144
Finally, HHS issued its COVID-19 plan at the cusp of planning and response at the
inception of the viral outbreak in early 2020.145 It, too, indicated that the plan
was developed through the sustained involvement of a broad array
of stakeholders, including agencies and organizations from across
the federal government, as well as representatives from the private
sector, state and local governments, the nonprofit sector,
community-based organizations, and the scientific and academic
community.146
The federal pandemic statutes thus largely anticipated overlapping and
collaborative efforts by multiple federal agencies to develop pandemic preparedness
plans, often with one agency, such as HHS, taking on a coordinating role. The plans
adopted pursuant to these statutes were all jointly developed. This approach is
sensible because it allows input by stakeholders, including federal agencies other than
the lead coordinating agency, that will play a role in implementing plans and
engaging in response actions. At the same time, the designation of a lead agency can
help minimize conflicting directives and avoid duplication of effort by assigning
specific but distinct tasks to the participating agencies. As the next section indicates,
the Trump Administration’s response to COVID-19 involved considerable
overlapping authority, which in many respects was problematic.

140. Id. at 30.
141. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, INTERIM PRE-PANDEMIC PLANNING
GUIDANCE: COMMUNITY STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA MITIGATION IN THE UNITED
STATES—EARLY, TARGETED, LAYERED USE OF NONPHARMACEUTICAL INTERVENTIONS 7 (2007),
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/pdf/community_mitigationsm.pdf?fbclid=IwAR0DiNfCTdB5alhJaOq3VtxhfymddjvDBCjJG7QPM55-nZ3YHNbAFYT1wio
[hereinafter CDC, INTERIM GUIDANCE].
142. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLAN, 2017 UPDATE
(2017), https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/pdf/pan-flu-report-2017v2.pdf.
143. Id. at 14.
144. ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
ANDIMPLEMENTATIONPLAN2015-2018(2018),https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/planning/authority

/nhss/Documents/nhss-ip.pdf.
145. See generally PANCAP, supra note 25.
146. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, supra note 144, at v.

356

Michigan Journal of Environmental and Administrative Law

2.

Vol. 10:2

Overlap in Federal Pandemic Response

Overlapping authority characterized not only the planning that occurred in
anticipation of a public health emergency such as COVID-19, but also in the response
that occurred in the wake of the outbreak. The substantial overlap in federal authority
that characterized the Trump Administration’s pandemic response led to significant
inefficiencies, inter-jurisdictional conflict,inaction, and inconsistent action when it
occurred.
Almost from the virus’s arrival in the United States, it was unclear who was
supposed to be in charge of directing planning and how to respond to and implement
those plans.147 The White House created its Coronavirus Task Force on January 27,
2020.148 At first, HHS Secretary Azar led the Task Force and was in charge of
developing the government’s pandemic response, although the NSC also had a
coordinating role.149 On February 28, 2020, however, Vice-President Mike Pence
took over leadership of the Task Force,150 assuming the role of the administration’s
virus “czar.”151 Not long after that appointment, however, Trump handed over
authority to develop and implement at least some aspects of the federal response to
the coronavirus to his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, who operated a “shadow” pandemic
response program.152 Neither the Vice-President nor Mr. Kushner had any relevant
disease-related expertise.153 Working out of FEMA, Kushner displaced HHS, which
under PAPHA should have been the lead federal agency,154 as the locus of the federal
147. See Toluse Olorunnipa, Josh Dawsey, & Yasmeen Abutaleb, With Trump Leading the Way,
America’s Coronavirus Failures Exposed by Record Surge in New Infections, WASH. POST (June 27, 2020, 5:38
PM),https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/with-trump-leading-the-way-americas-coronavirusfailures-exposed-by-record-surge-in-new-infections/2020/06/27/bd15aea2-b7c4-11ea-a8da693df3d7674a_story.html (“[T]he President’s top aides and other senior administration officials . . .
contradict one another on a daily basis.”).
148. GAO-20-625, supra note 25, at 89.
149. PANCAP, supra note 25, at 8; see also GAO-20-265, supra note 25, at 13 (“The National Security
Council also provides guidance to the White House Coronavirus Task Force on matters of policy.”).
150. PANCAP, supra note 25, at 8.
151. Adam Cancryn, Quint Forgey, & Dan Diamond, After Fumbled Messaging, Trump Gets a
CoronavirusCzarbyAnotherName,POLITICO(Feb.27,2020,11:32AM),https://www.politico.com/news
/2020/02/27/white-house-coronavirus-response-debbie-birx-117893.
152. Bess Levin, So Jared Kushner Is Running a “Shadow” Coronavirus Task Force, VANITY FAIR (Mar.
19, 2020), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2020/03/jared-kushner-shadow-coronavirus-task-force.
153. Michelle Goldberg, Opinion, Putting Jared Kushner in Charge Is Utter Madness, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr.2,2020),https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/02/opinion/jared-kushner-coronavirus.html;
Olorunnipa, Dawsey, & Abutaleb, supra note 147 (“Others without a background in public health,
including Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, have played an outsize role in guiding the federal
response.”). Cf. Klarman, supra note 3, at 101 (“Yet at least in part because of President Trump’s disdain
for expertise and the Republican Party’s general contempt for government, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) and the Department of Veterans Affairs confronted the nation’s largest public health
crisis in a century with vacant positions, acting officials, and a lack of experts.”).
154. See PANCAP, supra note 25, at 1.
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government’s management of the pandemic.155 Kushner’s emergence as a leader of
the response further obscured the hierarchy of decisionmaking authority among Azar,
Pence, and Kushner.156 The resulting confusion ran counter to the Administration’s
March 2020 COVID plan, which purported to “identif[y] anticipated roles and
responsibilities of HHS, other federal departments and agencies, and supporting
organizations, to establish lines of authority and avoid overlap and duplication of
effort.”157
The shifting leadership of the administration’s COVID response, and the
absence of clearly delineated lines of authority, reflected President Trump’s general
tolerance for, and at times encouragement of, the creation of conflicting power
centers among his subordinates. In this instance, the result was “policy paralysis,
confusion about who was in charge and a lack of a clear, consistent message about
how to reduce the risks from the pandemic.”158 According to the Commissioner of
the Food and Drug Administration for the first two years of President Trump’s term,
“[s]omeone needed to pull [the response] together . . . That didn’t happen on testing,
or on a whole lot of other things.”159
The lack of clear and consistent signals from the overlapping federal
response authorities plagued various aspects of the response. For example, HHS
posted guidelines, informing individuals who were exposed to the coronavirus but
were asymptomatic that they did not need to get tested, on CDC’s website without
CDC’s input or approval and over the objection of some of its scientists.160 Similarly,
HHS prepared and posted guidance on the importance of opening schools on CDC’s
website,161 and HHS revised CDC’s Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Reports.162
Senior public health officials charged that this inter-agency “meddling . . . was
turning widely followed and otherwise apolitical guidance on infectious disease . . .
into a political loyalty test, with career scientists framed as adversaries of the
155. Adam Cancryn & Dan Diamond, Behind the Scenes, Kushner Takes Charge of Coronavirus
Response, POLITICO (Apr. 1, 2020, 7:55 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/01/jared-kushnercoronavirus-response-160553?cid=apn.
156. See id. (reporting that Kushner recruited the head of Medicare’s innovation center “to organize
and manage key projects—bypassing the bureaucratic structures and internal rivalries that slowed progress
in the response’s early months”); cf. Tom McCarthy, Jared Kushner and His Shadow Corona Unit: What Is
Trump’sSon-in-LawUpTo?,THEGUARDIAN(Apr.5,2020,5:00AM),https://www.theguardian.com/wo
rld/2020/apr/05/jared-kushner-coronavirus-aid-trump-governors (“The precise dimensions of Kushner’s
emergency response role are difficult to pin down because his authority, which stems from his marriage,
exists outside the mapped structure of government agencies. He seems to be inventing his role on the fly,
and to have the power to do so.”).
157. PANCAP, supra note 25, at 1.
158. Shear et al., supra note 125.
159. Id.
160. See Apoorva Mandavilli, C.D.C. Testing Guidance Was Published Against Scientists’ Objections,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/17/health/coronavirus-testing-cdc.html.
161. Id.
162. Noah Weiland, Sheryl Gay Stolberg, & Abby Goodnough, Political Appointees Meddled in
C.D.C.’s‘HoliestoftheHoly’HealthReports,N.Y.TIMES(Sept.12,2020),https://www.nytimes.com/2020/
09/12/us/politics/trump-coronavirus-politics-cdc.html.
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administration.”163 An acting director of CDC during the Obama Administration
remarked that “[t]he idea that someone at H.H.S. would write guidelines and have
it posted under the C.D.C. banner is absolutely chilling.”164 CDC also posted and
then, apparently at the behest of the White House,165 removed guidance indicating
that the extent to which the virus is spread by airborne transmission is greater than
previously believed. According to public health experts, such changes had the
potential to shift policy over matters such as whether live-classroom instruction was
safe.166 The dissemination of conflicting information about matters such as the
incidence of cases impaired the ability of states, localities, and medical facilities to
respond to the virus, such as by directing medical supplies to areas most likely to
need them and making decisions about which facilities to open or close to public
access.

C. Uncoordinated Pandemic Planning and Response Efforts
The Trump Administration’s organizational failures were perhaps most
acute along the coordination-independence dimension. The Ebola outbreak
crystallized the importance of inter-governmental coordination in both pandemic
planning and response,167 and subsequent planning under the Obama and Trump
Administrations signified awareness of the value of such coordination. Yet those
lessons were lost on the Trump Administration, which could and should have been
better organized and prepared to combat public health and safety emergencies. As

163. Id.
164. Mandavilli, supra note 160.
165. Matt Stieb, CDC Reverses on COVID-19 Airborne Transmission, Says Guidelines Were ‘Posted in
Error,’N.Y.MAG.:THEINTELLIGENCER(Sept.21,2020),https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/09/cd
c-reverses-covid-transmission-guidelines-posted-in-error.html (“Throughout the pandemic, pressured by
the current administration to release politically friendly information and frustrated by the challenges of a
novel virus, the CDC has reversed an alarming number of recommendations.”).
166. See Tim Elfrink, Ben Guarino, & Chris Mooney, CDC Reverses Itself and Says Guidelines It
Posted on Coronavirus Airborne Transmission Were Wrong, WASH. POST (Sept. 21, 2020, 12:32 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/09/21/cdc-covid-aerosols-airborne-guidelines/.
167. See, e.g., Dr. Andra le Roux-Kemp, International and Operational Responses to Disease Control:
Beyond Ebola and Epistemological Confines, 15 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 247, 267 (2018) (“[D]uring the most
recent Ebola outbreak, the international response and coordination was found to be wholly inadequate and
lacking.”); James J. Misrahi, The CDC’s Communicable Disease Regulations: Striking the Balance Between Public
Health & Individual Rights, 67 EMORY L.J. 463, 475 (2018) (“One of the lessons learned from the 2014–
2016 Ebola epidemic was the need for a federal mechanism, in coordination with state and local public
health authorities, to allow for the controlled movement of individuals in need of further public health
monitoring, particularly regarding healthcare workers desiring to return to their home states of residence
from Ebola-affected countries.”); Rothstein, supra note 22, at 279 (“In the United States, due to its
complex and decentralized public health system, communication, coordination, calm, and proportionate
response quickly emerged as leading concerns when a few Ebola cases were diagnosed and treated.”).
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things turned out, coordination failures at both the planning and response stages had
devastating public health impacts.168

1.

Uncoordinated Pandemic Planning

Some public policy problems are not well suited to “seat-of-the-pants”
decisionmaking, requiring instead a coordinated plan of attack.169 To many, perhaps,
it might seem obvious that pandemic planning would be one such problem, as
previous presidential administrations had recognized. The federal statutes that
govern planning for public healthy emergencies are littered with mandates to various
federal officials to coordinate with each other; with state, local, and tribal officials;
and with private stakeholders such as hospitals. The Disaster Relief Act of 1974, for
example, authorizes the President to include in the federal government’s program of
disaster preparedness “coordination of Federal, State, and local preparedness
programs.”170 As noted above,171 the statute also directs the President to establish a
federal interagency task force to coordinate implementation of “predisaster hazard
mitigation programs administered by the Federal Government.”172 PAPHA requires
HHS to prepare “a coordinated” National Health Security Strategy173 whose
preparedness goals include “[m]inimizing duplication of, and ensuring coordination
between, Federal, State, local, and tribal planning [and] preparedness.”174 The
Strategy also must seek to “[i]mprov[e] coordination among Federal, State, local,
Tribal, and territorial entities . . . to prevent, detect, and respond to outbreaks” of
zoonotic diseases.175 HHS’s ASPR, a position created by PAPHA, must
“[c]oordinate with relevant Federal officials to ensure integration of Federal

168. See Yasmeen Abutaleb, Josh Dawsey, Ellen Nakashima, & Greg Miller, The U.S. Was Beset by
DenialandDysfunctionastheCoronavirusRaged,WASH.POST(Apr.4,2020),https://www.washingtonpos
t.com/national-security/2020/04/04/coronavirus-government-dysfunction/?arc404=true. For a list of
government entities that, prior to the COVID-19 outbreak, had developed “emergency-response plans to
guide pandemic response should the need arise,” see Berman, supra note 65, at 64.
169. See Paul R. Schulman, Nonincremental Policy Making: Notes Toward an Alternative Paradigm, 69
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1354 (1975). Tony Arnold put it this way:
Without some process of planning, Charles Lindblom’s “science of muddling through” – the
public-policy and public-administration foundation of adaptive management – becomes “the
science of drifting along.” We run the risk of having no goals or sense of direction, no go-to
plans ready to use when contingencies arise, no long-term investment of resources in
conservation, no proactive efforts, and no agreed-upon criteria, values, and processes for
evaluating possible alternative courses of action.
Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Adaptive Watershed Planning and Climate Change, 5 ENV’T & ENERGY L.
& POL’Y J. 417, 421 (2010).
170. 42 U.S.C. § 5131(a)(5).
171. See supra notes 129–30 and accompanying text.
172. 42 U.S.C. § 5134(a).
173. Id. § 300hh-1(a)(1).
174. Id. § 300hh-1(b)(5).
175. Id. § 300hh-1(b)(9).
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preparedness and response activities for public health emergencies,”176 and “[p]rovide
integrated policy coordination and strategic direction, before, during, and following
public health emergencies.”177 The national biodefense strategy and associated
implementation plan required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2017 must include “[a] description of the roles and responsibilities of Executive
agencies, including internal and external coordination procedures” in warning about
and protection against naturally occurring biological outbreaks.178
Federal executive branch officials, up to and including various presidents,
also emphasized the importance of coordination in pandemic planning. President
George W. Bush issued a directive making the DHS Secretary responsible “for
coordinating Federal operations within the United States to prepare for, respond to,
and recover from . . . major disasters, or other emergencies.”179 President Obama’s
executive order to implement the GHSA spurred by the Ebola virus directed “each
executive department, agency, and office (agency) . . . , as appropriate, [to] partner,
consult, and coordinate with other governments” and nongovernmental stakeholders,
including the private sector.”180
In the same vein, under the leadership of Ron Klain, in his role as the White
House Ebola response coordinator, the Obama Administration prepared a plan to
deal with future infectious disease threats, specifically including novel
coronaviruses.181 The plan’s objective was to assist government officials “in
coordinating a complex U.S. Government response to a high-consequence emerging
disease threat anywhere in the word.”182 During the transition to the Trump
Administration, outgoing Obama Administration officials briefed the new
Administration on the existence of the plan and conducted tabletop exercises to help
plan for a pandemic-like situation.183
Before the outbreak of the coronavirus, public health experts had warned
for months of the consequences of poor organizational choices, including the absence
of coordinated planning under the leadership of empowered federal officials. A
report issued by the bipartisan Center for Strategic & International Studies

176. Id. § 300hh-10(b)(4)(A).
177. Id. § 300hh-10(b)(4)(D).
178. 6 U.S.C. § 104(b)(4).
179. HOMELAND SEC. PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE 5 (HSPD- 5), MANAGEMENT OF DOMESTIC
INCIDENTS¶4(2003),https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Homeland%20Security%20
Presidential%20Directive%205.pdf.
180. Exec. Order No. 13747, Advancing the Global Health Security Agenda to Achieve a World
Safe and Secure from Infectious Disease Threats, 81 Fed. Reg. 78701, 78701 (Nov. 4, 2016).
181. PLAYBOOK, supra note 70. On Klain’s role in preparing the Playbook, see Victoria Knight,
Evidence Shows Obama Team Left a Pandemic ‘Game Plan’ for Trump Administration, KHN (May 15, 2020),
https://khn.org/news/evidence-shows-obama-team-left-a-pandemic-game-plan-for-trumpadministration/.
182. PLAYBOOK, supra note 70, at 4.
183. Knight, supra note 181.
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Commission184 on Strengthening America’s Health in 2019 recommended a
restoration of the dedicated pandemic response Directorate within the NSC. The
report urged the U.S. government to:
re-establish a directorate for global health security and biodefense
on the National Security Council (NSC) staff and [] name a
senior-level leader in charge of coordinating U.S. efforts to
anticipate, prevent, and respond to biological crises. These actions
will ensure that the necessary leadership, authority, and
accountability is in place to protect the United States from a
deadly and costly health security emergency.185
The report added that, as things then stood, “critical leadership gaps remain. It
remains unclear who would be in charge at the White House in the case of a grave
pandemic threat or cross-border biological crisis, whether natural, accidental, or
deliberate.”186 It claimed that a re-established health security and biodefense
Directorate within the NSC could not only facilitate planning for crises such as viral
outbreaks, but also promote efficient responses, strengthened accountability, and
better spending of scarce resources when an outbreak occurred.187
At least initially, the Trump Administration implicitly seemed to recognize
the need for coordinated leadership by an empowered federal agency. At a
Biodefense Summit hosted by HHS in April 2019, Secretary Alex Azar expressed
his concern about a pandemic flu and enunciated “a cardinal rule of leadership that
you have to have accountability, which means picking a leader . . . who has a particular
interest not just in our national security, but in preparedness for biodefense in
particular.”188 Yet, when COVID-19 began spiraling out of control, congressional
leaders such as Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell denied the existence of
any previously prepared pandemic “game plan,” while the Trump Administration’s
press secretary, while acknowledging the existence of the Obama Playbook, dismissed
it as useless.189 As a result, the Obama plan’s “detailed exact steps to take in the event
of an infectious disease outbreak” were largely if not entirely ignored.190

184. For a description of the CSIS, see supra note 63.
185. CSIS, CYCLE OF CRISIS, supra note 63, at 17.
186. Id. at 18.
187. Id.
188. Andrew Kaczynski & Em Steck, Top Administration Officials Said Last Year Threat of Pandemic
KeptThemUpatNight,CNNPOL.(Apr.3,2020,7:46PM),https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/03/politics/k
file-officials-worried-over-pandemic-last-year/index.html.
189. Victoria Knight, Obama Team Left Pandemic Playbook for Trump Administration, Officials
Confirm, PBS (May 15, 2020), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/obama-team-left-pandemicplaybook-for-trump-administration-officials-confirm.
190. Id.
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Even if the Trump Administration doubted the utility of the Obama
Playbook, it had the opportunity to engage in its own pandemic planning. After all,
the Administration took office in January 2017 and COVID-19 did not surface in the
United States until early 2020. Between January and August 2019, HHS actually ran
a simulated exercise, called “Crimson Contagion,”191 to test the nation’s readiness to
deal with a pandemic. The simulation involved U.S. tourists returning home after a
visit to China with a respiratory virus.192 The takeaways from the simulation included
findings that federal funding sources were insufficient, there was confusion about
how to apply the Defense Production Act, there was a lack of clarity on the roles of
different federal agencies, confusion existed among HHS, FEMA, and the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) on which federal agency would take the
lead in the event of a crisis, the relevant federal agencies used disparate information
management systems, and federal-state information sharing nodes were unclear.193
The report issued at the conclusion of the simulation exercise concluded:
[F]urther examination is needed to determine how federal
interagency partners will coordinate with one another on a variety
of pandemic influenza-specific response activities, including but
not limited to information-sharing with the White House
National Security Council, addressing shortages in medical
countermeasure and ancillary supplies, bilateral state-federal
request for information coordination nodes and processes, and the
respective roles and responsibilities of HHS and DHS/FEMA in
response to a complex and unique threat, with a nontraditional
lead federal agency.194
The 2019 simulation exercise “drove home just how underfunded,
underprepared and uncoordinated the federal government would be for a life-ordeath battle with a virus for which no treatment existed.”195 Whatever follow-up
planning, if any, that may have occurred, however, did not adequately address these
shortcomings, and the lack of coordination highlighted by the planning exercise
plagued the eventual response. President Trump asserted by way of justification that

191. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., CRIMSON CONTAGION 2019
FUNCTIONALEXERCISEAFTER-ACTIONREPORT5-8(2020),https://www.governmentattic.org/38docs
/HHSaarCrimsonContAAR_2020.pdf [hereinafter CRIMSON CONTAGION].
192. Id. at 9.
193. Id. at 16–28, 36–48; Carol Marin & Don Moseley, ‘Crimson Contagion 2019' Simulation Warned
ofPandemicImplicationsinUS,NBC5CHI.(Mar.24,2020,5:24PM),https://www.nbcchicago.com/news
/local/crimson-contagion-2019-simulation-warned-of-pandemic-implications-in-us/2243832/.
194. CRIMSON CONTAGION, supra note 191, at 58.
195. David E. Sanger, Eric Lipton, Eileen Sullivan, & Michael Crowleys, Before Virus Outbreak, a
CascadeofWarningsWentUnheeded,N.Y.TIMES(Mar.19,2020),https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/19/
us/politics/trump-coronavirus-outbreak.html.
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“nobody knew there would be a pandemic . . . of this proportion,” when in fact the
simulation exercise had predicted exactly that.196
Other past and present federal officials took issue with the Trump
Administration’s apparent lack of interest in rigorous pandemic planning and its
planning-related organizational choices, and in particular with the elimination of the
Global Health Security and Biodefense Directorate as a separate entity. Senator
Diane Feinstein sent a letter to Secretary Azar in January 2020 asking him to increase
preparedness and reinstate the Obama Directorate.197 At about the same time, Ron
Klain, who headed the Directorate before Beth Cameron, opposed the Trump
Administration’s decision to merge it into an NSC body with a broader and more
disparate jurisdiction. Klain asserted that
with no one in charge at the White House, there is no authority
to resolve disputes between federal agencies; no one to hold
agencies accountable for the pace and intensity with which they
implement the response; no one to resolve competing requests for
congressional funding; and no one to draw on the resources of the
security agencies of the government to help support the
response.198
The absence of coordinated federal leadership made it virtually impossible
to make any individual or agency accountable, especially in the face of President
Trump’s refusal to take any responsibility for anything the government did or did
not do in facing the virus.199 As one scholar has noted, “[a]nyone who has considered
pandemic preparedness has emphasized the need for a single, comprehensive, and

196. Mary Papenfuss, Trump Administration Failed Dry Run ‘Crimson Contagion’ Pandemic Exercise,
HUFFPOST (Mar. 20, 2020, 8:34 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/crimson-contagion-exercisetrump-administration-failures_n_5e744105c5b6eab7794560e6.
197. Dana Milbank, Opinion, Republicans Were Warned. Yet They Persisted in Defending Trump,
WASH.POST(Apr.1,2020,7:07PM),https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/04/01/republica
ns-were-warned-yet-they-persisted-enabling-trumps-coronavirus-debacle/.
198. Klain, supra note 64. According to one source, more than 50 federal executive branch political
appointees had some responsibility for biodefense matters as of 2015, “but [they] largely act
independently.” BLUEPRINT FOR BIODEFENSE, supra note 129, at 12.
199. Caitlin Oprysko, ‘I Don't Take Responsibility at All’: Trump Deflects Blame for Coronavirus Testing
Fumble, POLITICO (Mar. 13, 2020, 6:32 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/03/13/trumpcoronavirus-testing-128971. Others have suggested different ways to foster accountability, such as
transforming executive branch public health agencies into independent agencies in the traditional
administrative law meaning of that term (i.e., agencies that are typically headed by bipartisan multimember boards or commissions whose members are removable by the President only for cause). See, e.g.,
Eric E. Johnson & Theodore C. Bailey, Urgent Legal Lessons from a Very Fast Problem: Covid-19, 73 STAN.
L. REV. ONLINE 89, 98 (2020), https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/legal-lessons-from-a-veryfast-problem-covid-19/ (arguing that “we could refashion the [U.S. Public Health Service] on the model
of independent agencies such as the Federal Reserve Board” to shield its decisions from political
influence).
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harmonized strategy orchestrated by a single leader to control, prioritize, coordinate,
and hold agencies accountable.”200

2.

Uncoordinated Pandemic Response

These deficiencies in planning coordination considerably impaired the
Administration’s capacity to respond to the pandemic, which was saddled with its
own coordination challenges. The Trump Administration’s creation of multiple
power centers without specification of the relationships among them did nothing to
address the lack of clarity identified by HHS’s 2019 Crimson Contagion exercises
over the locus of pandemic-response authority.
When the COVID-19 virus first emerged in 2020, Trump’s Secretary of
HHS, Alex Azar, responding to concerns that the Administration was insufficiently
prepared to manage the pandemic response,201 insisted that White House
coordination of pandemic-related matters was adequate.202 As late as the end of
February 2020, he continued to insist that there was no need for a coronavirus “czar,”
because the existing strategy was working very well.203
A former senior U.S. official pointed out, however, that notwithstanding
the creation of the White House Coronavirus Task Force, “[f]or the first time since
9/11, you don’t have someone directly and immediately reporting to the president
responsible 24/7 for the major transnational threats we face—terror, cyber,
pandemics.”204 Even some senior Trump Administration officials acknowledged that
“[i]t’s better to have one person who has the backing of the White House to
coordinate.”205 According to a senior administration official, “the problem is no one
is sure who is in charge,”206 leading to “conflicting signals within the White House’s
200. Berman, supra note 65, at 78 (internal quotations omitted). The Panel asserted in its 2015
report that
[F]ederal biodefense activities are insufficiently coordinated. Authority and responsibilities
are dispersed among many cabinet agencies, without the benefit of a single leader to provide
directives and receive reports. Thus, while outcomes of individual department and agency
efforts may or not be successful, no one is held fully accountable for the necessary outcomes
of a mission-oriented and integrated biodefense enterprise.
BLUEPRINT FOR BIODEFENSE, supra note 129, at 11.
201. See e.g., Kaczynski & Steck, supra note 188 (referring to scrutiny over the Trump
Administration’s “preparations for the coronavirus pandemic”).
202. Eric Lutz, Will Trump Kick Coronavirus Response into High Gear?, VANITY FAIR (Feb. 26, 2020),
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2020/02/will-trump-kick-coronavirus-response-into-high-gear.
203. Strickler & Dilanian, supra note 103; Lutz, supra note 202 (reporting that Azar called the
appointment of a “czar” to lead the pandemic response unnecessary, that the administration had the
situation under control, and that federal interagency processes concerning the response were operating
smoothly).
204. Strickler & Dilanian, supra note 103.
205. Id.
206. Ashley Parker et al., Infighting, Missteps and a Son-in-Law Hungry for Results: Inside the Trump
Administration’sTroubledCoronavirusResponse,WASH.POST(Mar.14,2020,9:15PM),https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/politics/infighting-missteps-and-a-son-in-law-hungry-for-action-inside-the-trump-
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disjointed response to the crisis.”207 Similarly, a high-ranking official from the
George W. Bush Administration who worked on HIV-related matters opined that,
“[t]here isn’t any clear direction as to what the strategic goals are in each different
line of effort.”208 Despite these warnings, the Azar, Pence, and Kushner-led teams,
as well as state and local responders, appeared at times to act independently of one
another.
Coordination can be a valuable means of preventing or reducing some of
the more harmful features of independent government action (such as free-riding
and lack of accountability).209 Better coordination could have facilitated a more
effective set of responses to the pandemic, such as a robust nationwide testing and
tracing program capable of curbing the spread of the virus.210 Instead, lack of
coordination by the federal government impaired the ability of health care providers
to test for the virus.211
administrations-troubled-coronavirus-response/2020/03/14/530c28b4-6559-11ea-b3fc7841686c5c57_story.html; see also Lena H. Sun & Josh Dawsey, CDC Feels Pressure from Trump as Rift
GrowsOverCoronavirusResponse,WASH.POST(July9,2020,7:02PM),https://www.washingtonpost.co
m/health/trump-sidelines-public-health-advisers-in-growing-rift-over-coronavirusresponse/2020/07/09/ad803218-c12a-11ea-9fdd-b7ac6b051dc8_story.html (quoting Beth Cameron’s view
in the summer of 2020, as new cases of Covid-19 rose across the country, that “[a]t a time when our country
needs an orchestrated, all-hands-on-deck response, there is simply no hand on the tiller”).
207. Yasmeen Abutaleb, Ashley Parker, & Josh Dawsey, Kushner Coronavirus Team Sparks Confusion,
PlauditsInsideWhiteHouseResponseEfforts,WASH.POST(Mar.18,2020,7:01PM),https://www.washing
tonpost.com/politics/kushner-coronavirus-team-sparks-confusion-plaudits-inside-white-house-responseefforts/2020/03/18/02038a16-6874-11ea-9923-57073adce27c_story.html; see also Ashley Parker, Yasmeen
Abutaleb, & Josh Dawsey, Trump Administration Has Many Task Forces—But Still No Plan for Beating Covid19, WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2020, 9:45 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-task-forcescoronavirus-pandemic/2020/04/11/5cc5a30c-7a77-11ea-a130-df573469f094_story.html [hereinafter Parker
at al., Still No Plan] (describing the Trump Administration’s pandemic response structure as “a
bureaucratic nesting doll of groups with frequently competing aims and agendas”).
208. Parker et al., Still No Plan, supra note 207.
209. Cf. Ben Depoorter, Horizontal Political Externalities: The Supply and Demand of Disaster
Management, 56 DUKE L.J. 101, 115–16 (2006) (arguing that coordination between political actors can
mitigate incentives to free ride on the efforts of other levels of government); Shi-Ling Hsu, A GameTheoretic Model of International Climate Change Negotiations, 19 N.Y.U. ENV’T L.J. 14, 32 (2011) (arguing
that international coordination is necessary to prevent free riding in efforts to mitigate climate change);
J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the Administrative State:
A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 59, 70–71 (2010) (arguing that when obstacles such as
transaction costs and other collective action challenges prevent coordination, the result may be a “tragedy
of the regulatory commons” characterized by increased free ridership).
210. Berman, supra note 65, at 79.
211. See Maggie Fox, Coronavirus Testing Is ‘A Mess’ in the US, Report Says, CNN (May 21, 2020,
11:47 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/20/health/testing-coronavirus-cidrap-report/index.html. The
report referred to in Fox’s story concluded that “[c]ritical guidance and coordination at the federal level is
needed to meet the SARS-CoV-2 testing demand.” CTR. FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASE RESEARCH AND
POLICY, UNIV. OF MINN., COVID-19: THE CIDRAP VIEWPOINT PART 3: SMART TESTING FOR
COVID-19ANDANTIBODIES2(2020),https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/sites/default/files/public/download
s/cidrap-covid19-viewpoint-part3.pdf; see also id. at 4 (“For testing to be maximally effective, coordination
across the system and across jurisdictions is necessary. Ideally, this requires federal guidance, leadership,
and support, with strong jurisdictional buy-in at the state and local levels.”); Balz, Crisis, supra note 9 (“For
months, the Trump Administration has been running behind to bring testing capacity to the levels
needed.”).
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Similarly, the lack of coordination among federal agencies played a part in
CDC’s disastrous rollout of a test to detect the virus. The World Health
Organization (“WHO”) publicized a recipe for configuring a COVID-19 test on
January 13, 2020.212 Testing could not begin in the United States, however, until
CDC developed a test that the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) would
authorize for emergency use.213 Instead of endorsing the WHO test, which seemed
to be accurate, as nations such as Thailand quickly did, CDC scientists modified the
test in an effort to identify the novel coronavirus even if it mutated. The new CDC
test, however, generated false positives which were apparently linked to the CDC
modification of the WHO test. At that point, CDC could have dropped the
modification and forwarded the original WHO test to FDA to accelerate testing.
Instead, it tried to manufacture a new batch of tests that would be free of
contamination. Some CDC scientists lobbied for the unmodified WHO test to meet
surging demand for testing. But those responsible for the CDC testing regime
replied that the proposal was “a non-starter” because the FDA would never agree
with it. In fact, government officials later indicated that FDA would have considered
approving the WHO test without the CDC modification.214 The absence of
coordinated communication between CDC and the FDA thus slowed development
of an approved COVID test. Eventually, Dr, Fauci intervened, imploring HHS to
take charge. FDA finally told CDC that public health labs could use the WHO test,
but by then forty six days had elapsed since WHO had publicly shared its test
protocol.
After FDA approved testing protocols, the lack of interagency coordination
also hindered distribution of the tests and materials needed to administer them. Rick
Bright, the head of the Biomedical Advances Research and Development Authority,
whom President Trump fired in April 2020, testified before Congress that he was
“quite alarmed” over a shortage of swabs for testing.215 According to one account, “[a]
constant refrain from Bright throughout his hearing was highlighting what he
considered a lack of coordinated strategy from the White House.”216 That lack of
212. David Willman, The CDC’s Failed Race Against Covid-19: A Threat Underestimated and a Test
Overcomplicated,WASH.POST(Dec.26,2020,8:00AM),https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigatio
ns/cdc-covid/2020/12/25/c2b418ae-4206-11eb-8db8-395dedaaa036_story.html.
213. CDC could not distribute its own test to public health labs without FDA approval, and FDA
regulations prevented clinical labs from developing and conducting their own tests. Bob Ortega, Scott
Bronstein, Curt Devine, & Drew Griffin, How the Government Delayed Coronavirus Testing, CNN POL.
(Apr. 9, 2020, 8:07 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/09/politics/coronavirus-testing-cdc-fda-redtape-invs/index.html.
214. Willman, supra note 212.
215. Melissa Macaya, Adrienne Vogt, Alex Rogers, Maggie Fox, & Meg Wagner, 5 Takeaways from
RickBright’sHouseHearing,CNN(May15,2020,8:36AM),https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/14/politics/k
ey-moments-bright-hearing/index.html.
216. Id.; see also Aaron C. Davis et al., Ousted Vaccine Official Testifies Country Still Lacks Master Plan
AmidPandemic,WASH.POST(May14,2020,4:25PM),https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations
/ousted-vaccine-official-testifies-country-still-lacks-master-plan-amid-pandemic/2020/05/14/e9b6cd64960f-11ea-82b4-c8db161ff6e5_story.html (“Bright said there is still ‘no master plan’ for assessing the need
for and distribution of masks, testing swabs and other medical equipment.”); Parker et al., Still No Plan,
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coordination was not inevitable. In fact, a 2018 memorandum of agreement between
CDC and three of the nation’s biggest associations of lab testing facilities after the
outbreak of the Zika virus in 2016 called for extensive coordination in planning and
communication between CDC, public health labs, and the commercial sector.217 But
a combination of disinterest from the White House and overlapping but
uncoordinated authority among CDC,218 FDA, and the Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services apparently sidelined the cooperative efforts anticipated in the
2018 agreement.219
The Trump Administration’s failure to coordinate federal and state
response measures plagued the nation’s effort to combat the virus even during the
administration’s last weeks. Due to a combination of government-led and private
initiatives, FDA was able to approve two different versions of a coronavirus vaccine
in 2020 (the Pfizer-BioNTech and Moderna vaccines).220 But HHS Secretary Azar’s
prediction that 20 million people would get vaccinated by the end of 2020221 did not
come to pass. CDC had issued an interim playbook about coronavirus vaccination in
September 2020 and requested that states submit immunization plans.222 CDC
briefings on the vaccine rollouts were short on detail, however. CDC failed to inform
the states, for example, how many doses they would receive and when they would
get them. Essentially, the Trump Administration left it up to the states to devise
their own distribution strategies.223 In the absence of useful federal guidance, the
states sought to coordinate among themselves by sharing advice about common
logistical challenges. The administration blamed the slow pace of vaccination on
excessively rigid adherence by the states to federal guidance about how to prioritize
vaccination candidates. But others concluded that “[t]he delayed and disjointed
vaccine rollout [was] the product of poor coordination between the federal
government and the 50 states,” and that it had become clear that “the United States

supra note 207 (“There is still no concerted plan for getting vital medical supplies to states, which are left
to fight among themselves or seek favors from Trump.”).
217. Ortega et al., supra note 213.
218. The CDC, which had developed experience in pandemic response in connection with malaria,
smallpox, and HIV/AIDS, was largely sidelined in the Trump Administration’s response to the virus. Its
leadership was pressured by Administration officials, including President Trump, to weaken or rescind its
recommendations on personal conduct such as mask wearing and conditions for safe reopening of the
economy. See Sun & Dawsey, supra note 206.
219. See Ortega et al., supra note 213.
220. COVID-19Vaccines,U.S.FOOD&DRUGADMIN.,https://www.fda.gov/emergencypreparedness-and-response/coronavirus-disease-2019-covid-19/covid-19-vaccines (last visited Jan. 13,
2021).
221. See Veronica Stracqualursi, Azar Has Met with Biden’s Transition Team and Says 20 Million
Americans Could Be Vaccinated in ‘the Next Several Weeks’, CNN POL. (Dec. 10, 2020, 7:06 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/12/09/politics/alex-azar-coronavirus-vaccine-cnntv/index.html.
222. Lena H. Sun et al., Vaccines Were a Chance to Redeem Failures in the U.S. Coronavirus Response.
WhatWentWrong?,WASH.POST(Jan.11,2021,2:14PM),https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/covi
d-vaccine-slow-rollout/2021/01/11/2e804898-5100-11eb-bda4-615aaefd0555_story.html.
223. See supra notes 122–126 and accompanying text.
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has not learned from its fractured pandemic response and risks repeating some of the
same errors.”224

V. LEARNING FROM FAILURE
Even in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, sitting and former political
leaders from both political parties recognized the urgent need to reform the
government’s public health infrastructure, with many predicting that such
reorganization will occur, much as the Department of Homeland Security was
created in the aftermath of 9/11.225 Former Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle, for
example, remarked that “I don’t think there is any doubt that there will be a massive
effort to reorganize government in the aftermath of COVID-19.”226 Senator Susan
Collins agreed that “I would think some structural changes would come out of this .
. . We need some sort of coordinating structure.”227 As noted above,228 federal
legislators have introduced legislation that would draw upon the experience of the
COVID-19 pandemic to improve the government’s capacity to prevent and manage
future public health crises, either through congressional investigative committees,229
interagency task forces,230 or independent commissions.231 A significant component

224. Sun, supra note 222. The dean of the Brown University School of Public Health characterized
the administration’s effort to blame the states for the slow pace of vaccinations as “political theater and
obviously untrue. States undoubtedly have a critical role to play in vaccine distribution. But states alone
can’t mount one of the largest vaccination efforts in recent history. Moreover, not all 50 states are failing.”
Ashish K. Jha, Vaccination is Going Slowly Because Nobody Is in Charge, WASH. POST (Dec. 31, 2020, 12:10
PM),https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/12/31/vaccination-slow-trump-administrationstates/. According to Dr. Jha, resource-starved state agencies were “in no position to take on rapid
deployment of a new vaccine without a lot more resources and help.” Id. Thus, a lack of coordination
between the federal government and the states in financing the vaccination rollout contributed to its
laggardly pace.
225. See CAMACHO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 13, at 154–55.
226. Carl Hulse, Does a Dept. of Pandemics Sound Odd? Homeland Security Once Did, Too, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr.
11,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/11/us/coronavirus-pandemics-homelandsecurity.html.
227. Id.
228. See supra notes 10–14 and accompanying text.
229. H.R. Res. 935, 116th Cong. (2020), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/houseresolution/935, which the House approved in 2020, would have established a select Subcommittee on the
Coronavirus Crisis as an investigative subcommittee of the Committee on Oversight and Reform. See also
H.R. 6429, 116th Cong. (2d Sess. 2020), https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/116/hr6429/text
(establishing a legislative National Commission on COVID-19 in the United States); Press Release,
Congressman Adam Schiff, Schiff, Feinstein, Harris Introduce Legislation to Establish Bipartisan
CoronavirusCommissiontoExamineU.S.Response(Apr.10,2020),https://schiff.house.gov/news/pres
s-releases/-schiff-feinstein-harris-introduce-legislation-to-establish-bipartisan-coronavirus-commissionto-examine-us-response.
230. S. 4204, 116th Cong. (2d. Sess. 2020); see also S. REP. NO. 116-279 (2020) (reporting on the
proposed Federal Emergency Pandemic Response Act), https://www.congress.gov/congressionalreport/116th-congress/senate-report/279.
231. See,e.g.,H.R.6548,116thCong.§1(b)(2)(2dSess.2020),https://www.congress.gov/bill/116t
h-congress/house-bill/6548/text?r=9&s=1 (establishing a National Commission on the COVID-19
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of these proposals would be an effort to identify and evaluate the lessons learned
from the COVID-19 experience concerning how to structure effective pandemic
planning and response authority.232
Even the necessarily circumscribed evaluation of the planning and response
failures that plagued the Trump Administration’s management of the pandemic in
2020 provided in this article already suggests a number of valuable lessons. First, the
article illustrates several general postulates for policymakers and scholars to consider
about the characterization and assessment of governmental authority. More
specifically, it offers a preliminary outline about the governance structures that may
be better suited to effective pandemic planning and response.

1.

Structural Governance Lessons from Federal COVID-19 Planning and
Response

We derive at least five generalizable lessons from our analysis of the
COVID-19 experience during 2020. More broadly, each of these lessons makes the
case that how government authority is configured may often be a vital factor in the
success or failure in achieving public policy goals.233
First, whether intentionally or not, government authority is always
allocated at some particular point along each of three dimensions—the extent to
which authority is centralized, overlapping, and coordinated—and careful
governance requires recognition of the tradeoffs that each dimensional choice entails.
Decentralization, for example, can foster experimentation, provide opportunities for
diverse strategies, and leverage expertise; centralization may promote economies of
scale and uniformity. Overlapping authority can create a safety net in the event of
inaction by one authorized entity and creates resistance to agency capture, while
distinct authority may eliminate wasteful duplication of effort and lower regulatory
commons risks. Coordination, the aspect of structural governance whose absence
seems most responsible for the Trump Administration’s COVID management
failures, can promote pooling of resources or expertise, reduce risks of free-riding
and shirking, and minimize the risk of conflicting actions. But independence may
Pandemic in the United States “not just to look back at prior practices and mistakes but to learn lessons
as quickly as possible to better protect the United States going forward in the future”).
232. See, e.g., id. § 2(d)(2) (authorizing investigations into “the structure, coordination,
management, policies, procedures and actions of Federal, State, and local governments and nongovernmental entities relative to preparing for, detecting, preventing, and responding to epidemics and
pandemics, whether naturally occurring or caused by a State or non-State actor”); H.R. 6429, §§ 3(b)(10)–
(11) (requiring the Commission to examine, evaluate, and make recommendations concerning “the role
and responsibility of, and coordination among, departments and agencies of the United States” and “the
nature and extent of communication and coordination between the Federal Government and State,
territory, tribal, and local governments; between the Federal Government and the private sector; and
between the United States Government and the governments of foreign nations”).
233. See CAMACHO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 13, at 229 (arguing that “decisions concerning how
best to allocate or reallocate authority among different government entities are critical to the functioning
of government programs”).
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minimize administrative costs and groupthink and may promote beneficial intergovernmental competition.
How these competing values balance out is necessarily context-specific. It
is also political in the sense that prioritization of values is necessary when different
organizational alternatives create a different mix of advantages and disadvantages. In
some instances, for example, achieving the efficiency advantages of coordinating
authority in ways that enable resource pooling may be deemed more important than
groupthink prevention. In other instances, the reverse may be true, suggesting that
independent authority would be more desirable than coordination.
Second, the tradeoffs are often unlikely to be the same for all aspects of a
problem. Instead, they will typically vary for different governmental functions.
Thus, for example, authority to pursue certain functions may best be centralized,
such as when promoting economies of scale, ensuring uniform governmental action,
or achieving cost internalization is important. The bulk purchase of COVID testing
equipment by the federal government is an example of a function that would benefit
from economies of scale or resource pooling,234 while the criteria for approval of
vaccines clearly need to be developed and applied uniformly by a federal agency such
as FDA. Federal authorities should be responsible for the issuance of travel
restrictions to mitigate interstate (and international) spillover costs caused by spread
of the virus. Decentralization may be a better fit for other functions, such as when
particularized expertise, diversity of approach, or providing opportunities for
regulatory experimentation are a significant priority.235 Inevitably, given the
heterogeneity of activities involved in pandemic preparation and response, much of
federal pandemic preparation and response will necessarily be decentralized. And
both the creation and subsequent dissolution of the Directorate illustrate the value
of relying on directed, dedicated expertise in federal pandemic planning and response
activities.236

234. See, e.g., Paul Aubrecht et al., Centralized and Decentralized Responses to COVID-19 in Federal
Systems: US and EU Comparisons 2 (Law & Economics of Covid-19, Working Paper, Apr. 2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3584182 (arguing that “there may be a need for a
‘smart mix’ of centralized and decentralized health responses to the [Covid] pandemic,” and, for example,
that in a federal system, procurement and distribution of medical supplies and equipment “may best be
centrally administered in order [to] limit cross border externalities which may spill across the states in a
federal system, to take advantage of economies of scale and distribution advantages of a centralized
approach, and to prevent inefficient competition between states in the procurement of these material
goods,” and to prevent hoarding).
235. See Nicola & Scaccia, supra note 115, at 71–73 (describing the Italian experience in responding
to COVID-19).
236. The Obama Directorate centralized national authority for biological emergencies to take
advantage of economies of scale for functions such as information generation and distribution, facilitate
control of interstate externalities, and promote equitable distribution of critical medical supplies among
the states. However, it decentralized planning within the federal government to exploit the expertise of
different agencies over disparate aspects of pandemic management (such as epidemiological research,
medical treatment, and national security). PLAYBOOK, supra note 70, at 32–40.
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Third, it may be possible to mitigate the disadvantages of allocating
authority on a dimension by allocating it differently for different functions.237
Overlapping authority in some cases can create a safety net to hedge against inaction
by a single responsible entity.238 It can also make effective capture of agency
decisionmakers harder by increasing the entities that must be captured before
government policy is crafted to achieve a result desired by a private entity.239
Overlapping authority, however, may lead to inefficient duplication of effort and the
issuance of conflicting mandates or advice.240 The creation of multiple power centers
to deal with pandemic management led to considerable overlapping authority that
prompted confusion in disseminating information about matters such as the need for
testing of asymptomatic individuals and the scope of the risks posed by airborne
transmission of the virus.241 Overlap also may prompt inaction if multiple authorized
entities await action by another such entity. If inaction is accompanied by fingerpointing when problems are not being effectively managed, accountability is
impaired.242
Policymakers need to be cognizant of these tradeoffs. They should be
careful to rely on overlap only for functions where the safety net and anti-capture
benefits are particularly vital—such as in pandemic planning. With respect to
response, overlapping authority to perform functions such as developing scientific
information, analyzing data, and enforcing regulatory standards may create a
desirable safety net to alleviate the risks of inaction by any one entity. In a context
such as responding to public health crises that require rapid government action,
however, the stasis and languidness that overlap may induce are exactly the opposite
of what is needed. Overlapping pandemic planning authority therefore might best
be accompanied by clear and distinct authority for most functions in the thick of
emergency pandemic response to help reduce the adverse effects of conflicting
mandates and inaction. It may be desirable, for example, to create distinct authority
for functions such as information dissemination and restrictions on travel to foster

237. See CAMACHO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 13, at 232 (noting that “there might be opportunities
to adjust along a dimension on a function-by-function basis to maximize the advantages of each end of the
dimension”); id. at 94–99 (explaining how varying the extent of overlap by governmental function and
blending it with distinct authority can more effectively leverage the advantages of each end of that
dimension of authority).
238. Id. at 42.
239. Id.
240. See Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 SUP.
CT. REV. 201, 214; Jason Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 223 (2011).
241. See supra Part IV.B.2.
242. See Todd S. Aagaard, Regulatory Overlap, Overlapping Legal Fields, and Statutory Discontinuities,
29 VA. ENV’T L.J. 237, 288 (2011) (“Regulatory overlap thus may lead each regulator to shirk . . . within
an area of overlapping jurisdiction.”); David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The
Case Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796, 1809 n.54 (2008)
(citing William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L.
REV. 1, 30–33 (2003)) (describing “the accountability risk that comes with regulatory overlap: namely,
the potential that it will appear that no one is in charge and hence regulatory inaction will result.”).
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efficient resource allocation or avoid conflicting mandates. Further, the alternatives
along each of the allocation dimensions are rarely simple binary choices. In particular,
the choice of the extent of overlap is a continuum, allowing policymakers to choose
not merely between overlapping or distinct authority but also between more and less
overlap. As a result, policymakers may be able to reduce inefficiency costs from
overlap while still maintaining some overlapping authority (and the resulting
redundancy advantages).243
Fourth, it also may be possible to mitigate the disadvantages of allocating
authority along one dimension through the allocation chosen along a different
dimension.244 For instance, while coordinated authority has stand-alone advantages
and disadvantages as compared to independent authority, policymakers also can
leverage a range of different forms of coordination to mitigate some disadvantages
of inevitably overlapping authority (such as between state and federal response
agencies). Judicious hierarchical coordination, for instance, can help mitigate
duplication, conflict, and inaction from overlapping authority.245
Similarly, if policymakers choose a decentralized structure to provide
pandemic management, its effectiveness will often depend on whether the various
responsible entities with pandemic response authority act in coordination with one
another. As previously demonstrated, the Trump Administration failed to provide
even a minimally sufficient level of coordination in either pandemic planning or
response, which both exposed the disadvantages of the decentralized authority while
largely failing to tap its advantages.246 Decentralized planning has the capacity to
leverage the expertise of different federal agencies and of state and local officials, but
if the information and insights gleaned from those sources are not integrated into a
coordinated planning effort, the resulting plans may have gaps or inconsistencies that
hinder effective implementation. Decentralized (and overlapping) authority among
federal agencies over various aspects of the COVID response, such as the
development of testing protocols or the distribution of vaccines,247 contributed to the
spread of the virus in the United States. In contrast, carefully decentralized but
coordinated authority would likely have better leveraged the experimentation,
expertise, and diversity advantages of decentralization while minimizing risks of
inconsistencies or conflicting responses to the pandemic.
Fifth, perhaps the most pronounced lesson from federal planning for and
response to COVID-19 relates to the heterogeneity of inter-governmental
243. See CAMACHO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 13, at 41–43.
244. See, e.g., id. at 232 (asserting that “policymakers will find opportunities to adjust one dimension
of authority to address or reduce shortcomings of another”).
245. See id. at 232.
246. “The result was a leadership vacuum that led to an absence of a truly coordinated anti-COVID19 effort led by the federal government.” Berman, supra note 65, at 79. The Italian response to COVID19 also suffered initially from a lack of coordination between the national and regional governments, but
later phases of the response reflected better coordination and were more effective. See Nicola & Scaccia,
supra note 115, at 61–62, 64–67
247. See supra Part IV.A.2.
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coordination. Unlike the other two dimensions, coordination does not simply toggle
between more or less. Rather, the extent of coordination depends on a range of factors
such as the form of communication, the extent of its formality, its frequency, its
mandatory or discretionary nature, and its hierarchical or nonhierarchical
character.248 Because of the availability of these various forms of inter-governmental
coordination, it is important to analyze not only whether coordinated or independent
authority is desirable, but also the tradeoffs of choosing among these various types
of coordination.249 In other words, electing to coordinate government institutions is
only the first step. Various successive choices follow about the form and extent of
coordination that are critical to its success.
These tradeoffs may cut in different directions for various aspects of
pandemic planning and response. For example, because pandemic planning typically
takes place over a longer time horizon than response does, a collaborative process, in
which decisions are reached by consensus by implicated governmental entities, may
allow for a wide range of input by entities with differing perspectives, experience,
and expertise. The 2017 National Defense Reauthorization Act250 established just
such a collaborative planning process. The Act required the Secretaries of Defense,
HHS, Homeland Security, and Agriculture to jointly develop a national biodefense
strategy and associated implementation plan.251 The statutory directive to these
cabinet Secretaries to issue a joint strategy and plan required all three agencies to
agree on their contents.252 This is a horizontal form of coordination, in which
adopting a plan depends on consensus and each agency in effect has a veto over the
capacity of the others to dictate its contents. Such horizontal forms of coordination
may also be good choices when uniformity is less of a priority or when there is less
reason to expect or be concerned about free riding without hierarchical dictates.253
Hierarchical authority, in which one agency or official has the power to
dictate government-wide compliance and response, is a better choice for those aspects
of pandemic response that require rapid action, such as distribution of testing
equipment or vaccines. Vesting in one institution the authority to dictate the actions
of other agencies is almost certainly the swiftest coordination alternative (with the
possible exception of distinct, centralized authority) for implementing urgent
functions, like the allocation of scarce medical supplies to the places that most
urgently need them. Before the Biden Administration began, the incoming
President’s transition team announced that the new administration would request
248. See CAMACHO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 13, at 45–46.
249. Camacho & Glicksman, supra note 33, at 58 (urging policymakers to consider “various forms
of coordination, each of which will have its own set of costs and benefits”).
250. See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text.
251. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-238, § 1086(a), 130
Stat. 2000, 2423–24 (2016) (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 104).
252. Id. § 1086(a).
253. See Erin O’Hara O’Connor & Larry E. Ribstein, Preemption and Choice-of-Law Coordination,
111 MICH. L. REV. 647, 658 (2013) (“States’ ability to coordinate . . . often reduces or eliminates the need
for federally imposed uniformity. . . .”).

374

Michigan Journal of Environmental and Administrative Law

Vol. 10:2

that state governors issue mandatory mask directives with which local governments
would have to comply.254 While the collaboration between the federal government
and the states would not be hierarchical, the duty of localities to implement stateissued mask mandates would be.
Besides the level of synchronization, coordination also can be formal or
informal; long or short-term; voluntary or mandatory, cooperative or adversarial; and
frequent or occasional. Each of these choices raises different tradeoffs for
policymakers. In a fast-moving situation like responding to a viral pandemic,
frequent information sharing is essential.255 In other, slower-paced situations, such as
planning strategies for before the commencement of an outbreak, the lesser need for
frequent communication may not justify the expense of conducting it. Similarly,
many would consider it essential for a federal agency to mandate adherence by all the
states with travel restrictions that are designed to slow the spread of the virus.
However, the need for mandatory coordination may be less important in areas such
as how to prioritize the individuals entitled to receive a COVID vaccine. Voluntary
coordination is also an appropriate choice for certain forms of information exchanges
in formulating response plans. For example, states and localities should have the
opportunity but not the obligation to comment on proposed federal pandemic
response plans. Federal officials responsible for developing such plans, however,
should be required to solicit input from all affected entities.
The requirement that executive agencies share information on biological
outbreaks at the response phase of pandemic management256 is a weaker but longerterm form of horizontal coordination. The provision of the 2017 Act mandating that
the plan provide for improved and formalized interagency coordination and support
mechanisms257 makes it clear that this type of coordination may not be informal, but
otherwise fails to specify the respective roles of the four Departments or of the other
federal agencies subject to the strategy and plan. Giving one agency, such as CDC,
HHS, or FEMA, the authority to direct other public and private entities in the
distribution of available medical supplies and equipment such as tests, masks,
ventilators, or vaccines during a response would be a more hierarchical form of
coordination for that particular task.258

254. Biden Plan, supra note 109.
255. See, e.g., Parker et al., Still No Plan, supra note 207 (“One Trump adviser said that the CDC
has not provided local officials with enough data about what is happening nationwide.”). Compare Nicola
& Scaccia, supra note 115, at 74 (describing increased national-regional cooperation in Italy that “entailed
the sharing of information and the monitoring of public health policies that succeeded in containing the
spread of the pandemic”).
256. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, § 1086(b)(4).
257. Id. § 1086(b)(7).
258. Cf. CAMACHO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 13, at 46 (explaining that “providing a governmental
authority a de facto or express veto power over the activity of another authority” is “a more hierarchical
form of coordination”).
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Reconfiguring Federal COVID-19 Planning and Response

The Trump Administration’s allocational failures preceding and during the
COVID-19 pandemic suggest a number of possible reconfigurations that draw on
these lessons to parse some of the allocational dimensions of authority and
distinguish across governmental functions.
Decentralized Federal Planning. A simple but devastating lesson of the
COVID-19 pandemic is that a federal presence in pandemic planning is crucial. In
this sense, some amount of centralization in planning is vital for leveraging
economies of scale and promoting uniformity among the myriad of regulatory and
management authorities at the local, state, and federal levels that can influence the
nation’s ability to prepare for public health crises. Nonetheless, it perhaps is also
inevitable, in light of the broad and disparate nature of pandemics, that there be some
if not significant decentralization of authority. In fact, the disbandment of the Global
Health Security and Biodefense Directorate illustrates that the lack of a “point”
agency dedicated to pandemic planning can create regulatory neglect.259 Some level
of decentralization in planning can also leverage a wide range of agency expertise,
lead to tailored planning strategies, and allow opportunities for governmental
innovation and experimentation in planning.260 These effectiveness benefits appear
to be worth sacrificing any efficiency losses resulting from the loss of economies of
scale. They are especially worth pursuing on matters for which the uniformity
benefits of centralization are not critical.
Decentralized Federal Response. As it did with planning, the dissolution of the
Directorate demonstrated both the need for a federal presence but also the value of
a specific federal authority expressly assigned to promoting response, i.e., the
implementation of pandemic planning. Indeed, the need for rapid deployment of
response strategies weighs even stronger for reliance on decentralized response in
order to tap a broader range of capabilities across government activities and
regulatory sectors. In such instances, the expertise, experimentation, and diversity
benefits of decentralized authority may be especially valuable. CDC, for example,
may be the best choice to disseminate consistent and up-to-date information about
the risks of virus spread and the best ways to stem those risks, while FEMA’s
experience and expertise may favor putting it in charge of distribution of medical
supplies to areas ravaged by a pandemic.261 Relatedly, authority can be structured in

259. See supra notes 102–11 and accompanying text.
260. Cf. Caitrin Reilly, When in Louisiana, Do As the French Do: The Case for Integrated River Basin
Management in Louisiana, 30 TUL. ENV’T L.J. 41, 50 (2016) (“French water management emphasizes
deconcentration and decentralization, which allows for management plans tailored to the needs of specific
basins and input from all water users”).
261. During the 2020–2021 presidential transition, the Biden transition team indicated that it
intended to enhance the role of FEMA, an agency whose raison d’étre is disaster response, in distribution
of the COVID vaccines. Thomas Frank, Biden to Deploy FEMA for Vaccine Distribution, CLIMATEWIRE
(Jan. 4, 2021), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2021/01/04/stories/1063721633. Actions taken early
in the Biden Administration vested FEMA with pandemic response authority and responsibilities. See,
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ways that leverage the relative institutional competencies of different public
institutions. For example, more decentralized institutions can be assigned authority
over certain functions with a more local footprint, while centralized institutions can
be employed to deal with larger-scale issues (e.g., matters more prone to crossjurisdictional externalities) or issues for which uniform approaches or solutions are
particularly important (e.g., development of standards for approval of vaccines).
Overlapping Planning. Though it might lead to increased inefficiencies due
to duplication of effort, there are significant reasons to support reliance on a more
overlapping configuration of federal pandemic planning. Designed correctly, a
decentralized, overlapping planning regime can promote interagency accountability
and serve as a regulatory safety net that can limit the risk of regulatory inaction.262
In other words, the expectation is that the effectiveness gains of overlapping federal
planning authority are likely to outweigh the efficiency costs from duplication.
More Distinct Authority for Certain Response Actions. At least in some
circumstances, however, the tradeoffs in pandemic response may tilt toward more
distinct allocations of authority. The need for prompt, decisive action may lean
toward more exclusive authority that reduces wasteful duplication or risks of a
regulatory commons. The Trump Administration blamed the slow rollout of the
COVID vaccines on the states.263 Had applicable law or a federal pandemic plan
made it clear than a federal agency such as CDC or FEMA was exclusively
responsible for rapid and equitable distribution of vaccines, that kind of handwashing of responsibility would not have been possible (or at least would have been
even less credible).264 Besides concerns regarding efficiency, less overlap can help
avoid regulatory conflict and inconsistency.265 Nonetheless, in some circumstances it
might make sense to provide for some regulatory redundancy over response actions,
for example, when one anticipates that duplicative regulatory authority will increase
the likelihood of government action. Allowing states to negotiate with
pharmaceutical companies for the purchase of testing and other needed medical
equipment, for instance, creates a safeguard against the risk that the President will
refuse to invoke the Defense Production Act to bolster the production and
distribution of such supplies.266
e.g., Memorandum of February 2, 2021, Maximizing Assistance from the Federal Emergency Management
Agency to Respond to COVID-19, 86 Fed. Reg. 8281 (Feb. 5, 2021).
262. Cf. Walter G. Johnson, Note, Conflict over Cell-Based Meat: Who Should Coordinate Agencies in
U.S. Biotechnology Regulation?, 74 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 478, 489–90 (2019) (“Congress frequently assigns
agencies authority and responsibilities that overlap in substantive areas. Scholars list various reasons for
this phenomenon, often arguing that the overlap offers benefits in effectiveness, interagency
accountability, and avoiding stagnation.”).
263. See Sun, supra note 222.
264. President Biden established within HHS a COVID-19 Health Equity Task Force whose
mission includes “mitigating the health inequities caused or exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic and
. . . preventing such inequities in the future.” Exec. Order No. 13995, Ensuring an Equitable Pandemic
Response and Recovery, § 2(b)(i), 86 Fed. Reg. 7193, 7194 (Jan. 26, 2021).
265. CAMACHO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 13, at 40.
266. See supra notes 117–19 and accompanying text.
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Horizontally Coordinated Planning. A key lesson of the COVID-19 pandemic
is that effective interagency and inter-governmental coordination is vital for
pandemic planning. Yet the form of coordination is key to leveraging the advantages
of decentralized and overlapping authority. Largely horizontal coordination of
planning allows the pooling of resources and expertise and often will adequately
advance concerns of lack of uniformity or harmonization that can arise from
decentralized and/or overlapping jurisdiction.267 Contributing factors to the Trump
Administration’s failure to engage in effective horizontally coordinated planning
include: (1) dismissal of the Obama Administration pandemic Playbook; (2) the
failure to heed the lessons of its own Crimson Contagion exercise, which called out
the need for further examination of “how federal interagency partners will coordinate
with one another on a variety of pandemic influenza-specific response activities”;268
(3) its disbandment of the Directorate for Global Health Security and Biodefense
Directorate, which had been well positioned to lead a coordinated intergovernmental
planning effort; and (4) the lack of clear guidance to state and local governments
about how to integrate their plans with those of the federal government. By creating
a vacuum at the federal level and largely leaving the states to their own devices, the
administration undermined accountability for planning responsibilities and set the
stage for the piecemeal response efforts that followed. Re-establishing horizontally
coordinated federal planning is vital.
Hierarchically Coordinated Response. In some contexts, independently
exercised authority can diminish the risk of groupthink, spur innovation, or generate
productive competition among agencies.269 Allowing independent action, such as
state mask or social distancing requirements that the federal government is unwilling
to impose, may be preferable to certain forms of coordination (such as required
federal-state harmonization that may decelerate rather than accelerate governmental
action or hierarchical coordination that requires states to accept safeguards they deem
inadequate). Independently allocated authority is ill-suited, however, to functions
such as information distribution, given the need to avoid confusion resulting from
the dissemination of inconsistent information about the nature of health risks and

267. See John D. Blum & Jordan Paradise, Public Health Preparedness & Response: An Exercise in
Administrative Law, DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L., Spring 2018, at 1:
Responses to epidemics, pandemics, and other biological disasters require multiple
coordinated initiatives that combine sophisticated planning, sound emergency management,
effective stockpiles, solid geographic information systems, well-developed laboratory
surveillance and response, and effective management capabilities. Critical to the noted
elements of planning and response is the existence of a legal structure, which underpins the
operations of necessary programs. While the law may not be the first public health tool
considered in a disaster, it is fundamental to the effective functioning of multiple actors and
must be harmonized across jurisdictional lines.
See also id. at 8 (“The massive amount of coordination across public and private actors in the face of
biological catastrophes makes preparation and response planning a critical regulatory function.”).
268. CRIMSON CONTAGION, supra note 191, at 58.
269. CAMACHO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 13, at 47–48.

378

Michigan Journal of Environmental and Administrative Law

Vol. 10:2

the best ways to address them.270 Discrepancies in government advice on whether to
wear masks, for example, created considerable confusion.271 Independent authority
would also appear to be a disastrous choice in triage situations, where it is important,
for example, to allocate medical equipment to the areas hardest hit by disease. The
competition among the states for access to ventilators drove up the price of that
equipment and hampered the ability of some of the hardest hit states, like New York,
to procure the equipment they needed.272 Coordinated distribution of that equipment
could have minimized those problems. The bipartisan Blue Ribbon Study Panel on
Biodefense (co-chaired by former Democratic Vice Presidential candidate Joseph
Lieberman and Republican Tom Ridge, the first Secretary of DHS) recognized the
need to consider the appropriateness of coordinating on a function-by-function basis.
In its 2015 report, it decried the lack of coordination across a range of biodefenserelated functions, including information gathering, information dissemination,
monitoring, financing, and implementation of containment strategies.273 The
COVID-19 pandemic thus painfully illustrated the imperative of coordinated interagency and inter-governmental response to implement pandemic planning. As noted
above, however, deciding that coordination is required only begins to determine the
appropriate allocations of authority. Policymakers should also consider the
appropriate form of coordination. Although collaborative, horizontal coordination
may work well for pandemic planning, for reasons described above, a different, more
hierarchical form of coordination is more likely to promote effective pandemic
response action.

270. See, e.g., Leslie E. Gerwin, Planning for Pandemic: A New Model for Governing Public Health
Emergencies, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 128, 143 (2011) (“[T]he surfeit of information sources leave[s] us . . .
skeptical and confused about the accuracy of conflicting claims.”).
271. See, e.g., Christina Farr, Why Scientists Are Changing Their Minds and Disagreeing During the
Coronavirus Pandemic, CNBC (May 23, 2020, 9:15 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/23/whyscientists-change-their-mind-and-disagree.html; Zeynep Tufekci, Jeremy Howard, & Trisha Greenhalgh,
TheRealReasontoWearaMask,THEATLANTIC(Apr.22,2020),https://www.theatlantic.com/health/arc
hive/2020/04/dont-wear-mask-yourself/610336/.
272. See Olorunnipa, Dawsey & Abutaleb, supra note 147 (“Some states are still struggling to
procure testing kits and supplies for the kits, including swabs, and have pleaded for the federal government
to play a larger role in coordinating purchases, resolving supply shortages, and distributing the kits.”);
Ruthann Robson, Symposium: Pandemics and the Constitution, Positive Constitutionalism in A Pandemic:
Demanding Responsibility from the Trump Administration, 12 CONLAWNOW 15, 20 (2020) (“Perhaps most
chaotic has been the Administration's actions and inactions regarding necessary medical equipment,
including ventilators to assist patients in breathing and personal protective equipment (PPE) for medical
and other personnel to prevent them from becoming infected.”).
273. BLUEPRINT FOR BIODEFENSE, supra note 129, at 11–12, 26. The Panel regarded coordination
as a vehicle for prioritizing needed activities, designating responsibilities, and ensuring accountability. Id.
at 12. It did not, however, distinguish among the different forms of coordination.
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CONCLUSION

Perhaps understandably, much of the discussion of the failed handling of
the COVID-19 pandemic has focused on the Trump Administration’s tardy,274
callous,275 reckless,276 uninformed,277 incompetent,278 and discriminatory response.279
Given these failings, even a rationally conceived and thoughtful allocation of
authority may not have avoided a significant number of cases and deaths.
Unfortunately, attending to the allocation of government authority alone is rarely, if
ever, going to be sufficient to guarantee prevention of a pandemic or even effective
response to an outbreak. Even a well-structured allocation may fail if the tools
allocated to government institutions are deficient; if agency personnel and other
government leaders are hostile to scientific evidence; if key Executive officials like
the President are indifferent to the programs they are charged with implementing;
or if Congress fails to provide the resources to allow effective administration.
Moreover, some problems may be resistant to pre-planned, structured analysis and
response. There may be relatively little the government can do, to pick an extreme
example, to prepare for a collision between the Earth and a massive asteroid, even if
astronomers warn policymakers of the impending disaster.
Nonetheless, the Trump Administration’s confused and confusing
allocation of authority over both pandemic planning and response made delay,
inefficiency, and ineffectiveness almost inevitable. Those structural mistakes hold
important lessons. By choosing appropriate allocations of authority along each of the
three dimensions and differentiating allocations functionally, policymakers may be
able to alleviate some of the dysfunctions that contributed to the Trump
Administration’s chaotic and ineffective efforts to plan for and respond to the
COVID-19 pandemic. If so, the governmental planning and response to the next
public health crisis may be more effective.

274. See, e.g., Trump Was Too Slow in Virus Response: Poll, AFP (Apr. 16, 2020, 3:20 PM),
https://www.barrons.com/news/trump-was-too-slow-in-virus-response-poll-01587086405.
275. See, e.g., Glenn C. Altschuler, Opinion, The Crude and Callous Coronavirus Calculation of Chris
Christie and Donald Trump, THE HILL (May 10, 2020, 12:30 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/whitehouse/497004-crude-and-callous-coronavirus-calculation-of-christie-and-trump.
276. See, e.g., Ed Pilkington, Trump Death Clock Seeks to Bring ‘Accountability for Reckless Leadership’,
THE GUARDIAN (May 6, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/06/trumpdeath-clock-coronavirus-us.
277. See, e.g., Aja Romano, A New Investigation Reveals Trump Ignored Experts on Covid-19 for Months,
VOX (Apr. 12, 2020, 6:00 PM), https://www.vox.com/2020/4/12/21218305/trump-ignored-coronaviruswarnings.
278. See Lee, supra note 125 (reporting that one source characterized the Trump Administration’s
lack of any plan for vaccine distribution as “just further affirmation of complete incompetence”).
279. See Eric Lipton, David E. Sanger, Maggie Haberman, Michael D. Shear, Mark Mazzetti, &
Julian E. Barnes, He Could Have Seen What Was Coming: Behind Trump’s Failure on the Virus, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr.11,2020),https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/11/us/politics/coronavirus-trumpresponse.html?action=click&module=Spotlight&pgtype=Homepage.

380

Michigan Journal of Environmental and Administrative Law

Vol. 10:2

Public and private institutions can and should prepare for and seek to
minimize the uncertainty and disorder that accompany emergencies such as viral
pandemics through vigilant planning and adaptive response.280 Effective disaster
planning and response are not limited to designing effective substantive strategies or
decision-making processes. They also include structuring authority to leverage public
institutions in ways that tap their relative advantages and minimize their
limitations—perhaps allocating overlapping authority for functions that particularly
need safety net redundancies or deploying clear coordination mechanisms
(particularly in pandemic response, where hierarchical coordination is critically
important) to help promote prompt, efficient, and consistent action. Such allocations
may not only leverage relative institutional competencies but also help public
institutions manage uncertainty and promote adaptive response.281
Because it is unlikely that future crises will replicate the COVID-19
outbreak in all or even most respects, approaches that might have worked better in
reacting to this virus will not necessarily be the optimal ones for the next crisis.
Instituting a public system of periodic monitoring and adjustment of decisions about
how to allocate authority among relevant government officials, however, can further
reduce uncertainties and promote learning. Many have called for integration of
periodic monitoring and adaptive management mechanisms in decision-making
processes to manage uncertainty and develop more effective substantive strategies,282
including in disaster planning and response.283 And one of us has also called for
280. See Caner Hamarat et al., Adaptive Policymaking Under Deep Uncertainty: Optimal Preparedness
fortheNextPandemic,SYS.DYNAMICSSOC’Y(2012)(transcriptavailableathttps://proceedings.systemdy
namics.org/2012/proceed/papers/P1386.pdf) (“For an uncertain and complex future, adaptivity and
flexibility should be the main aim for designing robust policies.”); see also Fikret Berkes, Understanding
Uncertainty and Reducing Vulnerability: Lessons from Resilience Thinking, 41 NAT. HAZARDS 283, 287 (2005)
(discussing how focusing on adaptive management, or learning-by-doing, can support efforts to deal with
uncertainty in crisis); Nicola & Scaccia, supra note 115, at 64–67 (describing improvements in the Italian
pandemic response that resulted from “learning by monitoring” and adjusting allocations of authority in
response).
281. See Alejandro E. Camacho, De- and Re-constructing Public Governance for Biodiversity
Conservation, 73 VAND. L. REV. 1585, 1588–90 (2020).
282. See, e.g., GEORGE H. STANKEY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES: THEORY, CONCEPTS, AND MANAGEMENT INSTITUTIONS 31–33 (2005),
www.fs.fed.us/pnw/pubs/pnw_gtr654.pdf; INT’L INST. FOR APPLIED SYS. ANALYSIS, ADAPTIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT 1 (C.S. Holling ed., 1978); PANARCHY:
UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND NATURAL SYSTEMS 5 (Lance H. Gunderson &
C.S. Holling eds., 2002).
283. See Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Adaptive Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CLIMATE
DISASTER LAW 169, 177 (Rosemary Lyster & Robert R.M. Verchick eds., 2018) (discussing legal tools for
promoting adaptation, including “regulations, contracts, and procedural rules to implement adaptive
policies and strategies”); Daniel A. Farber¸ Catastrophic Risk, Climate Change, and Disaster Law, 16 ASIA
PAC. J. ENV’T L. 37, 48–49 (2013) (arguing that disasters should be viewed as cyclical so that decisionmakers can learn from past disasters, adapt policies to be more resilient in the future, and generate viable
policy options in the face of uncertainty); Charles R. Wise, Organizing for Homeland Security After Katrina:
Is Adaptive Management What’s Missing?, 66 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 302, 315 (2006) (arguing that homeland
security requires adaptive management, including for “professionals at various levels to work across
boundaries, plan and negotiate future activities, and communicate during operations to resolve
unanticipated problems”).
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application of such a learning infrastructure at a more macro level, i.e., for monitoring
and assessing program and agency performance.284 Our book also recommends,
however, the creation of a framework for promoting structural adaptive governance
that designates authority to a public agency to periodically monitor and assess the
efficacy of allocational choices (here, for pandemic planning and response).285 Any
changes that policymakers choose to improve pandemic preparedness and response
capacity should be flexible enough to adjust if past or current experience reveals that
an aspect of the structure of the government’s public health mechanisms is not
providing efficient, effective, equitable, or accountable governance.
The Trump Administration’s planning and response to the COVID-19
pandemic make clear that poorly designed programs are likely to create significant
barriers to success. As policymakers craft mechanisms to improve the government’s
capacity to address future public health crises, their goal should be to make
organizational choices that facilitate rather than hinder effective pandemic responses.
President John Kennedy often repeated a popular mistranslation286 of a Chinese
maxim that crisis requires awareness of danger, but also allows recognition of
opportunity.287 As devastating as the current pandemic has been and promises to be,
policymakers should seize upon the opportunity to transform lessons learned into
efforts to adjust the institutions of government to better respond to public harms, if
not prevent an epidemic in the first place.

284. See Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting Governance to Climate Change: Managing Uncertainty
Through a Learning Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 1, 64–76 (2009). Cf. Riyanti Djalante et al., Adaptive
Governance and Managing Resilience to Natural Hazards, INT’L J. DISASTER RISK SCI. no. 4, 2011, at 1, 10
(2011) (outlining how adaptive governance, described as “polycentric and multilayered institutions,
participation and collaboration, self-organization and networks, and learning and innovation,” can support
resilience in disaster risk reduction efforts); David L. Markell & Robert L. Glicksman, Dynamic
Governance in Theory and Application, Part I, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 563, 566 (2016) (providing a “conceptual
framework to assist policymakers seeking to design regulatory structures likely to produce effective
governance in dynamic circumstances”).
285. CAMACHO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 13, at 236. We suggest delegating the authority to
engage in these tasks to a new “learning infrastructure” agency or to an existing, relatively nonpartisan
entity such as the Government Accountability Office.
286. See Victor H. Mair, danger + opportunity ≠ crisis: How a Misunderstanding About Chinese
Characters Has Led Many Astray, PĪNYĪN.INFO, http://www.pinyin.info/chinese/crisis.html (last updated
Sept. 2009). The translation reflected in President Kennedy’s campaign speeches has nevertheless become
a popular meme and “favorite rhetorical device of public figures across the political spectrum.” Benjamin
Zimmer, Crisis = Danger + Opportunity: The Plot Thickens, LANGUAGE LOG (Mar. 27, 2007, 4:09 PM),
http://itre.cis.upenn.edu/~myl/languagelog/archives/004343.html.
287. Senator John F. Kennedy, Speech at the 1959 Convocation of United Negro College Fund,
Indianapolis, Indiana, (April 12, 1959) (transcript available at http://www.jfklibrary.org/assetviewer/archives/JFKSEN/0902/JFKSEN-0902-023).

